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INTRODUCTION
The use of decisionmaking theories that go beyond the economic
model of the rational actor has long been part of the study of adminis-
trative agencies. Herb Simon, the Nobel laureate economist, whom
psychologists also like to recognize as one of their own, started devel-
oping his theory of bounded rationality as part of an inquiry into pre-
cisely how public administrators make decisions.1 The sociologist and
political scientist, James March, has focused to a great extent on politi-
cal organizations, including administrative agencies, to illustrate the
influence that institutions and behavioral rules have on individual
decisionmakers. 2
Law, however, has been slow to utilize theories of decisionmaking
when analyzing the conduct of administrative agencies. Administra-
tive law generally treats an agency as a black box. 3 That body of law
addresses how an agency interacts with the President, Congress, the
judiciary, regulated entities, putative beneficiaries of regulation, and
the media. 4 With a few notable exceptions, administrative law ignores
what goes on inside the agency.5 In line with the recent emphasis on
1 Herb Simon published his first edition of Administrative Behavior in 1947, and of
Public Administration in 1950. See HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR: A STUDY OF
DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES IN ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATIONS, at vii (4th ed. 1997); HER-
BERT A. SIMON ET AL., PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, at xiii (Transaction Publisher 1991) (1950).
2 See JAmES G. MARCH &JOHAN P. OLSEN, REDISCOVERING INSTITUTIONS: THE ORGANI-
ZATIONAL BASIS OF POLITIcs 16-17 (1989).
3 See RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET A-, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS (3d ed. 1999).
4 Seeid. at 7.
5 Those exceptions focus on the independence of administrative law judges (ALJs)
within the agency and how the courts review factual findings when the agency's findings
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economic analysis as a means of understanding how law works, admin-
istrative law scholarship in the last several decades has borrowed from
positive political theory, which treats institutions like the various
branches of government and administrative agencies as individual ac-
tors reacting rationally to outside influences. 6 Thus, one can find
models of how a rational agency will promote its interests by formulat-
ing a rule that comports with the agency's objectives to the greatest
extent possible without going so far as to incite the judicial or political
branches to countermand it.
7
To be sure, even if administrative law does not concern itself di-
rectly with what occurs inside the black box of the agency, much re-
cent legal scholarship does look at internal agency dynamics to try to
predict the likely impact of administrative law doctrine. But, with the
exception of isolated remarks such as that certain legal rules or
agency structures could result in phenomena like groupthink,8 or that
agency staff engage in boundedly rational decisionmaking, 9 scholars
treat internal agency dynamics by assuming that the participants in
the process adhere to basic principles of rational decisionmaking.
That assumption is not so much wrong as incomplete. At the margins,
incentives, whether applied to an institution like an agency or to indi-
viduals, matter. Legal scholars, however, are beginning to realize that
incentives are not the only things that matter. A host of other factors
whose influence often cannot be reduced to the simple level of carrots
and sticks also bear on how individuals within agencies perform deci-
differ from those of the ALJ. See, e.g., Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 496
(1951) (holding that, in order to pass muster under "substantial evidence" review, agency
factual determinations must in some way take into account the examiner's determination);
Nash v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 675, 681 (2d Cir. 1989) (upholding Secretary of Health and
Human Service's policy to target and pressure ALJs with high rates of reversing denials of
Social Security Disability claims).
6 See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Separated Powers and Positive Political Theory: The Tug of
War over Administrative Agencies, 80 GEO. L.J. 671, 675-702 (1992) (using positive political
theory to examine the effect of the judiciary and executive branch on Congress's efforts to
control agency behavior); Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and
Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REv. 431,
433-45 (1989) (examining agencies through principal-agent theory, as well as through
perfect equilibrium and structure-induced equilibrium theories).
7 See Jerry L. Mashaw, Improving the Environment of Agency Rulemaking: An Essay on
Management, Games, and Accountability, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1994, at 185,
246-47.
8 Thomas 0. McGarity, The Internal Structure of EPA Rulemaking, LAw & CoN-rzmp.
PROBs., Autumn 1991, at 57, 92.
9 See Clayton P. Gillette &James E. Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. PA. L. REv.
1027, 1100 (1990); Thomas 0. McGarity, Regulatory Analysis and Regulatory Reform, 65 TEx.
L. REv. 1243, 1271-72 (1987); Sidney A. Shapiro, Administrative Law After the Counter-Refor-
mation: Restoring Faith in Pragmatic Government, 48 U. KAN. L. REv. 689, 742 (2000).
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sionmaking tasks and, hence, how agencies go about making
decisions.10
Scholarship about judicial review of agency regulation, like ad-
ministrative law scholarship generally, has proceeded by assuming, ei-
ther implicitly or explicitly, that the agency and its staff act rationally.
When public choice theory first burst onto the scene, agencies were
portrayed as pawns for the benefit of private, rent-seeking interest
groups, and their staffs," captured by the very industries they were
supposed to regulate. 12 One remedy was for the courts to review
agency decisions actively to protect against the effects of such
capture.13
Of late, active judicial review has been disfavored by most aca-
demics. In particular, numerous scholars have argued that judicial
review of agency rulemaking imposes burdens on the agency and that
the agency will, in response, resort to regulatory means less well suited
than notice and comment rulemaking or will simply abandon regula-
tion altogether. 14 These conclusions implicitly follow from assumed
rationality of agency regulatory processes; they reflect the basic eco-
nomic principle that increasing the cost of a good-rulemaking-de-
creases the production of the good. Other scholars have contended
that because agencies act defensively in response to potential judicial
challenges, the rulemaking process is ossified and unduly costly. 15 Im-
10 See Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories ofJudgment and Decision Making in Le-
gal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REv. 1499, 1506-19 (1998) (surveying the
use of behavioral decision theory in various legal disciplines); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The
"New" Law and Psychlogy: A Reply to Critics, Skeptics, and Cautious Supporters, 85 CORNEt L.
REv. 739, 743-63 (2000).
11 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL.
ECON. 807, 809-12 (1975); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELLJ.
ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 3, 3-6 (1971); see also DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II 229-46
(1989) (discussing the theory of rent seeking).
12 See Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHL-KErN L.
REv. 1039, 1060-61 (1997). For a comprehensive description of the capture theory of
agencies, see generally PAULJ. QUIRK, INDUSTRY INFLUENCE IN FEDERAL REGULATORY AGEN-
CIES (1981).
13 See Merrill, supra note 12, at 1064-67.
14 SeeJERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 151-52
(1990) (concluding that judicial review led the National Highway Traffic Safety Adminis-
tration to abandon setting safety regulations in favor of recalls); R- Shep Melnick, Adminis-
trative Law and Bureaucratic Reality, 44 ADMIN. L. REv. 245, 247 (1992) (arguing that the risk
of reversal of rulemakings for reasons an agency cannot predict or control will deter
rulemaking generally); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Two Problems in Administrative Law: Political
Polarity on the District of Columbia Circuit and Judicial Deterrence of Agency Rulemaking, 1988
DUKE L.J. 300, 302-03 (1988) (same).
15 See, e.g., Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process,
41 DUKE LJ. 1385, 1410-20 (1992) (offering specific examples of agencies stymied byjudi-
cial review), Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Unintended Effects ofJudicial Review of Agency Rules:
How Federal Courts Have Contributed to the Electricity Crisis of the 1990s, 43 ADMIN. L. Ruv. 7, 8




plicit in some of these criticisms is an assumption that one gets little
benefit from the incentives that judicial review places on agency ac-
tors. 16 At least two scholars have gone so far as to argue that judicial
review has a negative impact on the quality of individual rulemaking
decisions.
17
This Article presents a modest defense of judicial review of
rulemaking. Its thesis is that the psychology of individual decision-
making biases and group decisionmaking dynamics suggests that judi-
cial review does improve the overall quality of rules. The Article is
modest in four respects. First, it addresses only arbitrary and capri-
cious review of agency legislative rules; 18 it does not address judicial
review of issues of law such as interpretations of statutes or regula-
tions.19 Second, it recognizes that there are significant limitations on
the use of studies of decisionmaking. Psychological papers for the
most part reflect outcomes of controlled studies in laboratory settings,
and there is no way of knowing how these results will translate into the
real world of agency decisionmaking.20 Hence, the conclusions of this
Article are tentative. Third, the Article recognizes that there is no
objective metric for measuring how good a rule is. Those with differ-
16 See Shapiro, supra note 9, at 746.
17 See Frank B. Cross, Pragmatic Pathologies ofJudicial Review of Administrative Rulemak-
ing, 78 N.C. L. REv. 1013, 1044-57 (2000) [hereinafter Cross, Pragmatic Pathologies]; Pierce,
supra note 15, at 26-27; see also Frank Cross, Shattering the Fragile Case for Judicial Review of
Rulemaking, 85 VA. L. REv. 1243, 1313-14 (1999) [hereinafter Cross, Shattering the Fragile
Case] (questioning the value of dialogue between agencies and the courts).
18 The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) definition of a rule includes statements
by an agency about how it will interpret its authorizing statute or legislative rules, as well as
statements about how the agency intends to implement its policies. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4)
(2000). Unlike legislative rules, however, which must be formulated using at least notice
and comment procedures, there are no processes specified for formulating interpretive
rules and policy statements. See id. § 553(b) (2000). Although I believe thatjudicial review
would improve the quality of these nonlegislative rules, the processes by which they are
formulated vary so much from agency to agency and rule to rule that it would be difficult
to discuss the details of how judicial review would influence those processes. Hence, for
the sake of simplicity and to allow me to focus on how judicial review might influence some
of the detailed internal agency processes that go into the formulation and adoption of a
legislative rule, I limit my discussion to notice and comment rulemaking.
19 By this limitation, I mean to exclude review in which the court can dictate the
substantive outcome to the agency, because in such cases to a great extent it is the court
and not the agency that ultimately decides on the regulatory policy. Arbitrary and capri-
cious review, unlike review of legal issues, generally allows a reviewing court only to re-
mand for further consideration or explanation of issues about which the court did not find
the agency's reasoning persuasive. Although arbitrary and capricious review, as currently
applied, permits courts to impose impossible burdens on an agency upon remand, and
thereby dictate the status quo as the ultimate outcome, in many cases an agency can and
does adopt essentially the same rule with further explanation or minor modification. See
William S. Jordan, III, Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary and Capricious Review Significantly
Interfere with Agency Ability to Achieve Regulatory Goals Through Informal Rulemaking?, 94 Nw. U.
L. REv. 393, 415-17 (2000).
20 See Jennifer Arlen, Comment: The Future of Behavioral Economic Analysis of Law, 51
VAND. L. REv. 1765, 1769 (1998).
[Vol. 87:486
COGNITIVE LOAFING
ent values and preferences may rate the same rule as wise or foolish.
The discussion of rulemaking quality thus focuses only on the care
that the agency takes in actually making the decision and the likeli-
hood that the agency avoids known decisionmaking biases. Fourth,
and perhaps most importantly, the Article does not address the detri-
mental impact that such review might have on the efficiency of the
process, the propensity of the agency to use rulemaking, or the overall
agenda the agency pursues. In short, the Article addresses the effect
ofjudicial review on the quality of rulemaking decisions, but does not
address whether, overall, arbitrary and capricious review is good or
bad. Nonetheless, the Article attempts to take into account complex
psychological influences on agency decisionmaking in analyzing
whether arbitrary and capricious judicial review likely improves the
quality of rulemaking.21 It thus adds to the quite extensive literature
assessing the likely impact of judicial review by borrowing explicitly




When individuals make decisions, they do not act as economists
assume. Economists assume that an individual optimizes, a process
that involves considering all potential alternatives and relevant factors,
balancing the detrimental impacts of each alternative against its bene-
fits, and choosing the alternative that maximizes some measure of the
individual's preferences.22 In reality, individuals tend to make choices
by use of decisionmaking rules. Which rules they apply varies from
situation to situation, but within a particular context, individuals often
21 In discussing the impact of judicial review on agency rulemaking, I refer to the
impact of such review on the agency staff that provides information and prepares analyses
for the head of the agency, who is ultimately responsible for issuing a rule. Implicit in this
discussion is an assumption that the staff effectively dictates the rule rather than that the
agency head is free to choose the rule and is constrained only by legal and political param-
eters. This, of course, is an unrealistic simplifying assumption; agency staff presents infor-
mation, analyses, and options that do not dictate the final rule but do constrain the
ultimate decisionmaker's choice. The Article's conclusion, that judicial review improves
the quality of rulemaking, remains valid because improving the quality of the staff's deci-
sionmaking decreases the likelihood that the options presented to the agency head are
tainted by biases.
22 Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON. 99, 99 (1955),
reprinted in 2 HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF BOUNDED RATiONALT". BEHAVIORAL ECONOM-
ICS AND BusNEss ORGANIZATION 239, 239 (1982). This is not to say that economists assume
away uncertainty and the costliness of information. See GAvY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC
APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 6 (1976). Rather, economists assume that the individual
considers her lack of information and invests in such information only to the extent that
the investment is likely to maximize the individual's preferences-that is, an individual
invests in the optimal level of information. See id. at 6-7.
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do not think about whether the rules they apply are appropriate or
whether they maximize the net benefits of the decision. In addition,
psychologists have shown that decisionmakers make cognitive errors
that lead to systematic-that is, predictable-biases. 23 Although ex-
pertise and the group nature of agency decisionmaking can alleviate
many such biases, it can also amplify some biases.24 In order to better
understand how judicial review affects the quality of agency decision-
making, it is therefore helpful to review the potential problems that
may beset such decisionmaking.
A. Rule-Based Decisionmaking
Optimization of complex decisions requires collecting and
processing vast amounts of information. Individuals generally have
neither the time to collect and analyze such information nor the capa-
bility of performing all the necessary comparisons that optimization
entails. 25 Therefore, people simplify the cognitive task: instead of op-
timizing, they "satisfice." 26 Satisficing entails considering alternatives
until one is identified that meets a preset level of satisfaction. 27 Once
that alternative is identified, the decisionmaker chooses it even
though it may not be the best available alternative.
28
Even satisficing is an incomplete description of how individuals
make complex choices among various alternatives. To satisfice, one
must still determine what level of satisfaction is adequate and the
source and order of alternatives that one will consider.29 In addition,
one must determine what information one will consider, how much
analysis of benefits and detriments one will perform, and the kind of
analysis one will use in making a decision. Although satisficing is sim-
pler than optimizing, people generally rely on decisionmaking rules
for these determinations.30 By decisionmaking rule, I mean the use of
predetermined categories into which a person places factual circum-
stances to derive an outcome.
31
23 See infra note 42 and accompanying text.
24 See discussion infra Parts I.B.1-2, III.B.
25 3 HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY. EMPIRICALLY GROUNDED
ECONOMIC REASON 295 (1997).
26 Id.
27 See id. at 295-96.
28 See id. at 296.
29 See id.
30 See Xueguang Zhou, Organizational Decision Making as Rule Following, in ORGANIZA-
TIONAL DECISION MAKING 257, 259 (Zur Shapira ed., 1997).
31 SeeJAMES G. MARCH, A PRIMER ON DECISION MAKING: How DECISIONS HAPPEN 58
(1994) (defining "rule following" as a three-step process that asks the decisionmaker to
evaluate the kind of situation she is in, what kind of person she is with respect to the
decision, and what a person of that kind does in a situation of the kind identified).
[Vol. 87:486
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Decisionmaking rules apply even to fairly simple choices, like de-
ciding where to eat lunch on a particular day. People do not consider
all the restaurants in town and decide which is best. Rather, they limit
the alternatives based on factors like the kind of food they are in the
mood for, the time it takes to get to the restaurant, the speed of ser-
vice, the price, and potentially a host of other factors. In fact, it would
not be unusual for an individual to limit her consideration of restau-
rants to a handful that she frequents for lunch, and to determine
which one of that handful satisfies her particular cravings at the time.
When a regulator has to decide on standards such as the personal
exposure limits for a toxic substance in the workplace, the decision-
making factors can become much more complex, and the need for
decisionmaking rules more crucial.
32
Decisionmaking rules are the product of experience. In an
agency, decisionmaking rules may reflect the experience of the mem-
bers of a particular office and may incorporate the office's feedback
from previous decisions. These rules often are handed down as rou-
tines that govern an office's behavior in a manner that avoids unpleas-
ant outcomes. 33 Decisionmaking rules may also reflect the
professional training of those in the office. 4 Thus, such rules gener-
ally allow an office to utilize its learned experience and the expertise
of its staff in a coherent and efficient manner. In addition to simplify-
ing decisionmaking, by restricting the universe of relevant categories
and therefore the universe of relevant information, rules also allow an
office to resolve uncertainty in a predictable manner.35
Although decisionmaking rules are self-imposed and can be mod-
ified without any formal procedures, they can nonetheless cause an
agency to reach bad decisions. Agency staff tend to follow decision-
making rules unthinkingly.3 6 That is precisely the point: the agency
32 See Ronald A. Heiner, The Origin of Predictable Behavior, 73 AM. ECON. REv. 560,
565-67 (1983) (describing how organizations develop simple predictable behavior, such as
norms, in response to the complexity of a decisional situation).
33 See RIcHARDn R. NELSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF Eco-
NOMIC CHANGE 99 (1982) (asserting that "routinization of activity in an organization consti-
tutes the most important form of storage of the organization's specific operational
knowledge"); Barbara Levitt &James G. March, Organizational Learning, 14 ANN. REv. Soc.
319, 323, 327-29 (1988) (describing how experiential knowledge becomes part of an or-
ganization's memory); cf Robert Axelrod, An Evolutionary Approach to Norms, 80 AM. POL.
Sci. REv. 1095, 1109 (1986) (concluding from computer simulations that learning from
experience can lead to norms, but also that, without a "metanorm" or some other external
mechanism for supporting a norm, norms created by such learning can collapse).
34 See JAMEs Q. WILSON, BuREAucRAcy. WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY
THEY Do IT 59-65 (1989).
35 See Zhou, supra note 30, at 261.
36 Cf Dennis Chong, Values Versus Interests in the Explanation of Social Conflict, 144 U.
PA. L. Rxv. 2079, 2084 (1996) (suggesting that habits that dictate choice-i.e., decision-
making norms-can reflect mindless repetition).
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uses the rule to avoid having to devote resources to thinking through
the decision in light of every factor that might bear on the wisdom of
that decision. But unthinking application can lead an agency to apply
a decisionmaking rule outside the context for which the rule is appro-
priate.37 Moreover, rules tend to outlive their usefulness; 38 an agency
may continue to apply a decisionmaking rule even when the rule is far
from optimal for the typical situation the agency faces. For an agency
to change a rule, it needs feedback that the rule is not working satis-
factorily. An agency usually will not alter a decisionmaking rule unless
it faces a crisis that vividly calls into question the rule's benefits;39 or
the structure of the decisionmaking team changes to include individu-
als whose training and experience leads them to use different deci-
sionmaking rules and hence to question the ones that the office has
traditionally used;40 or an external monitor such as the President,
Congress, or the judiciary imposes a constraint that requires the
agency to alter the rule.41 Thus, office norms and decisionmaking
rules can lead to ad hoc suboptimal decisions by agency rulemaking
staff.
B. Heuristic Biases
In addition to the ad hoc errors introduced by inappropriate use
of office-specific decisionmaking rules, psychologists have identified
certain decisionmaking rules or heuristics that most people tend to
37 See MARCH, supra note 31, at 82-91 (explaining how biases in recalling and evaluat-
ing experiences, as well as in interpreting feedback regarding the outcomes to which rule
application leads, can result in development of maladaptive rules); HillelJ. Einhorn, Learn-
ing from Experience and Suboptimal Rules in Decision Making in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCER-
TAiNrw. HEURISTICS AND BIASES 268, 273-76 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982)
[hereinafter JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY] (explaining how feedback from outcomes
can reinforce suboptimal decisionmaking rules); Heiner, supra note 32, at 568-70 (describ-
ing how the evolutionary process for developing rules that govern human behavior may
not result in optimal behavior, and may even allow dysfunctional behavior to persist); cf.
Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1697, 1711-25
(1996) (arguing that social norms, in general, can be inefficient).
38 See B. Guy PETERS, AMERICAN PUBLIC POLICY- PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE 98-99 (3d
ed. 1993); FRANCIS E. ROURKE, BUREAUCRACY, POLITICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 30 (2d ed.
1976).
39 See Zhou, supra note 30, at 278.
40 Cf DOUGLAS YATES, BUREAUCRATIC DEMOCRACY: THE SEARCH FOR DEMOCRACY AND
EFFICIENCY IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 132 (1982) (asserting that "the force of [guild-like]
professionalism is diminished by conflict among various professional groups over the
shape and substance of policy").
41 See Zhou, supra note 30, at 268 (noting the influence of external legal requirements
on internal decisionmaking norms); cf. Errol Meidinger, Regulatoy Culture: A Theoretical
Outline, 9 LAW & POL'Y 355, 370-72 (1987) (noting that statutes and court decisions can
help structure an agency's regulatory culture, but cannot dictate that culture uniquely).
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use, and that can lead to systematic biases in individual choices. 42
Heuristics provide cognitive shortcuts, based on experiences that most
of us share from everyday decisionmaking, that reduce the effort that
one must put into decisions and yet still yield sufficient accuracy for
such decisions.43 For certain classes of decisions, however, the bias
may render the decision insufficiently accurate.44 Moreover, because
the bias is predictable, there are often feasible alternative decision-
making techniques that can avoid the biased judgments that result
from use of heuristics.
Psychologists have discovered numerous heuristics that can lead
to systematic bias. As commenters on this Article indicate, one might
complain that such heuristics are shooting up like weeds and there-
fore that it is impossible to take them all into account when structur-
ing agency decisionmaking processes. The argument is that if one
corrects for one bias, he might unwittingly create another. Such bi-
ases, however, can be classified into typologies of cognitive errors and
social influences. Heuristic biases might result from cognitive limita-
tions; decisionmakers may simply lack the knowledge or ability to as-
sess information accurately no matter how hard they try. For
example, if one is not familiar with Bayesian statistics, one would not
appreciate the need to consider base rates when evaluating how evi-
dence bears on the likelihood of an event. Biases may result from
memory, attention, or perceptual shortcuts in situations where the
decisionmaker is capable of making unbiased decisions, but where
everyday experience has led her to trust in rules of thumb rather than
more formal analyses.45 For example, a decisionmaker might overesti-
mate the frequency of an occurrence that is salient and hence easily
comes to mind. The actual frequency of the event often is something
that the decisionmaker can look up. Biases may also result from social
influences that cause the decisionmaker to consider factors that do
not bear on the correctness of a decision. For example, a person may
change an estimate of the probability of an event if she knows that
others disagree with that assessment even though the others have no
better information than she does about the probability. The person
may be reacting to the uncertainty in her own estimation, or may sim-
ply wish to avoid being looked upon disfavorably by those who made a
different assessment. If one structures decisionmaking processes to
alleviate entire typologies of errors, one likely will reduce bias without
creating new biases.
42 For a general discussion of heuristics and the biases to which they might lead, see
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 37, and ScoTr PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OFJUDG-
MENT AND DECISION MAKING 107-88 (1993).





In fact, administrative decisionmaking already is structured to re-
duce some biases. In particular, the administrative process uses vari-
ous forms of review, including judicial review, to hold decisionmakers
accountable. Because this Article is concerned with the types of
agency biases that judicial review might affect, I limit my discussion to
those biases that most likely will be influenced by accountability. In
addition, the administrative process relies on experts to search for and
analyze information that bears on the ultimate decision, and such ex-
perts are less likely to fall into many heuristic traps that snag the un-
wary layperson. There are, however, also some biases to which experts
may be more susceptible. In discussing biases that are affected by ac-
countability, I organize the discussion according to whether the ex-
pertise of the decisionmaker is likely to amplify, mollify, or have no
systematic effect upon the extent of bias.
1. Biases that Expertise Is Likely to Exacerbate
a. The Egocentrism Bias
Egocentrism is "an inability to take another's perspective, which
is tantamount to assuming that another's perspective is precisely one's
own. '4 6 Individuals tend overly to attribute their own knowledge-
"beliefs, opinions, suppositions, attitudes, and related states of
mind"47 -to others. 48 They do so because, in determining what
others know, an individual starts from a base of what she knows, and
adjusts to take into account special attributes that would make her
own knowledge different from that of the average person.49 An indi-
vidual, however, often does not compensate sufficiently for the differ-
ences between herself and the average person, either because she is
unable to assess accurately all of the ways in which her knowledge is
unique, or because in the process of solving a particular problem in
which the assessment of others' knowledge is important, she simply
fails to attend sufficiently to the fact that others differ from her.50 As a
result of inaccurately assessing others' knowledge, a decisionmaker
may incorrectly predict how others are likely to act in various situa-
tions,51 an assessment that agencies frequently must make when
adopting regulations.5 2
46 Raymond S. Nickerson, How We Know-and Sometimes Misjudge-What Others Know:
Imputing One's Own Knowledge to Others, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 737, 738 (1999).
47 Id. at 737.
48 Id.
49 See id. at 742.
50 See id. at 747-51.
51 See id. at 750.
52 Commonly, an agency must determine the likelihood that putative beneficiaries of
regulation will engage in conduct that subjects them to the risk that the regulation seeks to
avoid, and that the regulation will lead them to avoid such risks. For example, Food and
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Expertise is likely to exacerbate the egocentrism bias. At the sim-
plest level, experts' knowledge differs more from that of the average
person than does the knowledge of nonexperts, and this may make it
more difficult for experts to correct for such differences.5 3 More spe-
cifically, experts process information using cognitive structures that
uniquely reflect their training and experiences, and it may be impossi-
ble for an individual to comprehend fully how others who do not
share those cognitive structures are likely to process the same informa-
tion.54 Psychological studies of expert decisionmaking support this
hypothesis. Individuals with expertise about equipment, like cellular
phones, who themselves have developed skill in using such equipment
were less accurate in predicting the time it would take a novice to
perform a specified task with that equipment than were nonexpert
experienced users. 55 One such study concluded that "the primary dif-
ference between those with more and those with less expertise was the
accuracy with which they recalled their own novice performance of
the task."'5
6
This hypothesis would also explain certain outcomes of the "ulti-
matum game. '5 7 In the game's simplest version, an individual is given
a sum of money and told to divide it by making an offer to a second
person.58 If the offeree accepts the offer, the offeror pays him the
offered sum and keeps the difference; if the offeree declines the offer,
no one keeps anything.59 Rational behavior would predict that the
offeree should accept any offer, and that therefore the offeror should
offer one cent to maximize what she receives.60 In fact, individuals
tend to offer more than this amount, and offerees turn down offers
Drug Administration regulations on labeling the nutritional content of food are predi-
cated on the assumption that such labeling will lead consumers to alter unhealthy eating
habits. Sometimes the agency must predict how regulated entities will react to regulation.
For example, there is significant debate about the policy of the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) to minimize penalties for violations reported by the violator as part of a
voluntary self-auditing system. The EPA refuses to promise not to apply "gravity based"
penalties-penalties over and above requiring the violator to disgorge any benefits gleaned
by its failure to comply with regulations-for such self-reported violations. Regulated com-
panies claim that there is little incentive to establish a system of finding and reporting
violations if they are potentially subject to full punishment, while the EPA fears that these
companies will abuse such a promise by being lax in taking care to prevent violations.
Obviously, establishing a system for the efficient prevention and reporting of environmen-
tal violations depends greatly on whether the EPA's fears are justified.
53 See PamelaJ. Hinds, The Curse of Expertise: The Effects of Expertise and Debiasing Methods
on Predictions of Novice Performance, 5J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 205, 206 (1999).
54 See id.
55 See id. at 207-20.
56 Id. at 218.
57 For a general description of the literature on this game, see RicHARD H. THALER,
THE WINNER'S CURSE: PARADOXES AND ANOMAUES OF ECONOMIC Lin 21-35 (1992).
58 Id. at 21.
59 Id.
60 See id. at 22.
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that they find too low, even though they lose the value of that offer by
doing so.61 In an experiment involving offers to and from students in
both psychology and commerce classes, the commerce students both
offered less and were willing to accept less than the psychology stu-
dents. 62 This could indicate either a different conception of fairness
among the students in each class, or that some of the commerce stu-
dents, trained in economics, acted in accordance with economic ra-
tionality. Of particular interest, however, is the fact that the
commerce students' offers to psychology students, being lower than
those of the psychology students' offers to psychology students,
63
risked a greater likelihood of having their offer rejected. The com-
merce students seemed to underestimate the possibility that psychol-
ogy students would approach the offer from something other than a
rational choice perspective and therefore might turn down an offer
that one might consider insultingly low.
6 4
b. Overconfidence
Another bias to which experts may be more prone than novices is
one in the confidence of predictions.65 This bias can have an impor-
tant impact on public policy decisions. For example, an agency often
has to factor into its regulatory analyses the likely costs of regulation
to determine if the regulation is economically justified or feasible.
66
In doing so, the agency will have to rely on predictions about the
likely well-being of the future economy in assessing the impact of a
rule on an industry. Overconfidence in a prediction about the health
61 See id. at 23-25.
62 Daniel Kahneman et al., Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics, 59 J. Bus. S285,
S291 (1986).
63 Id.
64 Unfortunately, because the experiment did not include offers from commerce stu-
dents to other commerce students, it does not reveal directly whether commerce students
altered their offers depending on whether the offerees were similar to themselves or differ-
ent. At least one other study, however, suggests that individuals with unique information
do not sufficiently appreciate the extent to which people who lack that information will act
differently. See Colin Camerer et al., The Curse of Knowledge in Economic Settings: An Experi-
mental Analysis, 97 J. POL. ECON. 1232, 1235-44 (1989) (demonstrating that business stu-
dents who were well informed about some relevant economic variables inaccurately
predicted the forecasts of less informed people regarding corporate earnings, even when
they had an incentive to make accurate predictions).
65 I am indebted to Professors Jeff Rachlinski and Cynthia Farina's Article in this Sym-
posium for informing me of the relationship between expertise and biases in confidence.
See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal Government
Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 558-61 (2002).
66 See Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 655(b) (5) (1994) (pro-
viding criteria for Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) to set standards
to exposure of toxic substances); Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993) (requiring
agencies to perform cost-benefit analyses for rules that have a significant impact on the
economy), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2000).
[Vol. 87:486
COGNITIVE LOAFING
of the economy can lead an agency to impose regulations that are
more onerous than the legal standard under which the agency oper-
ates would justify.
Individuals tend to rely on the weight of evidence-that is, how
determinative the evidence would be were it reliable when making
decisions: the greater the weight, the more confident they are in their
predictions. Yet, statistically, confidence should be a product of the
quality of the evidence as well. Those asked to make predictions often
ignore the quality of evidence. For example, it is well documented
that predictions about future events depend more on the proportion
of past events that agree with the prediction without much regard to
the sample size of the historical evidence.6 7 This causes individuals to
underestimate appropriate confidence when events are very predict-
able and to overestimate confidence when events are unpredictable. 68
Experts are less likely to exhibit inappropriate underconfidence be-
cause they get frequent and accurate feedback regarding highly pre-
dictable outcomes, which allows them to calibrate their confidence
with reality for such outcomes. For unpredictable events, however,
experts tend to rely on "rich models of the system in question" and to
ignore the quality of the data, which provides experts with false confi-
dence about the likelihood of predictions that flow from these
models. 69
2. Biases that Expertise Is Likely to Mitigate
In spite of the psychological pitfalls that expertise brings to deci-
sionmaking groups, expertise nonetheless may mitigate other human
errors and biases. In particular, expertise may decrease technical er-
rors, lessen the group's reliance on easily recalled events, and also
diminish the consideration of irrelevant information. A discussion of
each potential benefit follows.
a. Technical Errors in Making Decisions
The wisdom of many decisions that agencies make depends on
the correct use of numerous technical criteria. For example, deci-
sions involving uncertainty require analysis of statistical probabilities,
and it is well established that individuals often ignore base rates in
estimating the likelihood of an occurrence given the observation of
certain evidence. 70 Individuals also fail properly to adjust the confi-
67 See Dale Griffin & Amos Tversky, The Weighing of Evidence and the Determinants of
Confidence, 24 COGNIIVE PSYCHOL. 411, 413 (1992).
68 See id. at 430.
69 See id.
70 When evaluating the probability of an event given some evidence, individuals are
likely to ignore base rates when they are incidental, rather than causally related, to evi-
dence and when the evidence is more specific than the base rate information. See Amos
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dence of predictions based on multiple inputs to reflect the correla-
tion of these inputs.7 1 These biases, if reflected in administrative
decisionmaking, can cause an agency to predict the probability of an
event inaccurately or to underestimate the uncertainty surrounding
such a prediction. When making investment decisions, the old eco-
nomic adage advises that one should ignore sunk costs, but people
intuitively tend to let such costs influence their choices. 72 This has
obvious implications for agency rules that depend on evaluations of
the cost of investments by regulated entities.
Certainly, experts who are trained to use technical decision rules
will perform better than laypeople who are unaware of the rules.
Therefore, one might expect agency experts not to suffer from biases
caused by failure to use such rules. Experts, however, often are una-
ware of the proper task structure for the particular decisions they
make. In addition, experts may not receive the kind of feedback nec-
essary for them to realize that alternatives to the technical decision-
making rule that they should use are inaccurate, and, hence, may fail
to use proper technical rules. 73 Even those who are aware of such
rules often fail to utilize them when making decisions. For example,
business administration students asked to make investment decisions
failed to heed the sunk cost adage, even when they were told to evalu-
ate the pros and cons for their decisions thoroughly.74 It appears that
Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Evidential Impact of Base Rates, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCER-
TAINTY, supra note 37, at 153, 155-59. Even when individuals do take base rates into ac-
count, however, they frequently fail to adjust their probability evaluations sufficiently. See
id. at 154.
71 Individuals tend to judge the likelihood of an outcome by how representative it is
of the evidence with which they are presented. Multiple inputs that are highly correlated
often share traits that make them representative of an outcome. As a result, the more
correlated inputs are, the more they tend to reinforce predictions of an outcome and
make evaluators more confident in their predictions, even though statistically, the reliabil-
ity of predictions decreases as the correlation of inputs increases. See Daniel Kahneman &
Amos Tversky, On the Psychology of Prediction, 80 PSYCHOL. REv. 237, 248-49 (1973).
72 See Hal R. Arkes & Catherine Blumer, The Psychology of Sunk Cost, inJJDGMENT AND
DECISION MAKING 97, 99-103 (Terry Connolly et al. eds., 2d ed. 2000) [hereinafter JuDG-
MENT AND DECISION MAKING].
73 See Einhorn, supra note 37, at 282 (explaining how lack of knowledge of the struc-
ture of a decisionmaking task can render information about decision outcomes irrelevant
for providing feedback on decisionmaking rules); see also Colin F. Camerer & Eric J. John-
son, The Process-Performance Paradox in Expert Judgment: How Can Experts Know So Much and
Predict So Badly ? in RESEARCH ON JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 342, 356 (William M.
Goldstein & Robin M. Hogarth eds., 1997) [hereinafter RESEARCH ONJUDGMENT AND DECI-
SION MAKING] (noting that "inaccurate [decisionmaking] rules may persist because experts
who get slow, infrequent, or unclear feedback will not learn that their rules are wrong").
74 See Itamar Simonson & Barry M. Staw, Deescalation Strategies: A Comparison of Tech-
niques for Reducing Commitment to Losing Courses of Action, 77J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 419, 422-24
(1992); see also Itamar Simonson & Peter Nye, The Effect of Accountability on Susceptibility to
Decision Errors, 51 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 416, 430-32 (1992)
(reporting similar results when business administration students were asked to solve
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experts, like laypeople, are apt to use appealing rules of thumb in
making decisions that differ from, and may conflict with, technical
decision rules appropriate for the choice.
b. The Availability Heuristic and Biases Due to Ease of Recall
Individuals tend to rely on the availability heuristic-the facility
with which they can recall a type of event-as an indication of the
probability that such an event will reoccur. The availability heuristic
leads individuals to overestimate the probability of an event that
comes easily to mind.75 This bias can cause a decisionmaker to attri-
bute cause unduly to a salient event or to predict a greater likelihood
of occurrence of events that he remembers.76 An example of the im-
pact of bias from the availability heuristic may be the oft-stated statistic
in legal scholarship that virtually every rule promulgated by the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) is challenged in court.7 7 In fact,
depending on what one counts as a rule, only three to twenty-six per-
cent of EPA rules actually are challenged, and only about thirty-three
percent of major rules, those rules requiring a regulatory impact anal-
ysis, are judicially reviewed.78 The difference between the folklore
and reality may well reflect that rules subject to challenge are much
more salient in the minds of members of the agency and hence easier
for them to recall, leading agency members to believe that eighty per-
cent or more of all rules were challenged.
79
One might expect expertise to mitigate the propensity of deci-
sionmakers to overstate the probability of easily recalled events. Pre-
sumably, experts study and know the likelihood of the occurrence of
events that relate to their expertise. Moreover, experts deal with simi-
problems not explicitly involving investment, but raising the issue of whether to ignore
sunk costs).
75 For a general discussion of the availability heuristic and the biases that it can cause,
see Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and
Probability, inJUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 37, at 163.
76 PLous, supra note 42, at 121.
77 E.g, KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN &JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERI-
cAN DEMOCRACY 367 (1986) (reporting that virtually every regulation issued by agencies
such as the EPA and OSHA are challenged in court); WILSON, supra note 34, at 284 (assert-
ing that 80% of EPA rules wind up in court).
78 Gary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated
Rulemaking, 46 DuKE LJ. 1255, 1298-1301 (1997) (finding that 26% of all EPA rules issued
from 1987 to 1991 and 35% of major EPA rules issued from 1980 to 1991 were chal-
lenged); Christopher H. Schroeder & Robert L. Glicksman, Chevron, State Farm, and EPA
in the Courts of Appeals During the 1990s, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,371, 10,375 &
n.40 (Apr. 2001) (reporting that 33% of EPA major rules issued during this period were
challenged, 3% of all EPA rules issued in the 1990s resulted in decisions in the courts of
appeals).
79 The figure of 80% for rule challenges has been traced to the first EPA Administra-
tor, William Ruckelshaus, but was repeated by at least two other Administrators, Lee
Thomas and William Reilly. Coglianese, supra note 78, at 1296-97.
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lar situations repeatedly, and hence get feedback on how well their
decision rules work. Hence, if experts are apt to overestimate the oc-
currence of an event, they may have compensating decision rules that
minimize the impact of that overestimation on their final decision.
80
There are, however, also reasons to believe that experts may be
more susceptible to the availability heuristic than are laypeople. By
the very nature of expertise, when considering events, experts employ
cognitive structures unique to their training and experience. Hence,
they may be led to view evidence of the occurrence of an event from a
particular perspective that obscures the possibility that their view of
the evidence is biased."' Experts also have different information sets
from which they draw examples of phenomena. For these reasons,
experts may be more likely to rely on ease of recall for an event than
laypeople who may be aware of the limits of their knowledge and
hence more uncertain when asked to evaluate situations with which
they have little experience.8 2 Moreover, the fact that experts are
asked to evaluate similar situations repeatedly does not guarantee that
they will factor feedback from outcomes in order to correct inaccura-
cies that result from a reliance on ease of recall. For complex deci-
sions, the outcome may not alert the decisionmaker that the problem
was caused by reliance on the ease of recall of specific events.
8 3
c. Consideration of Irrelevant Information
A third psychological bias that expertise is likely to mitigate is the
consideration of irrelevant information, also known as the "dilution
effect." This effect describes the tendency of nondiagnostic informa-
tion to dilute the accuracy of predictions that people would have
made had they been presented with only diagnostic information.84 In
other words, decisionmakers allow irrelevant information to alter the
decisions that they would otherwise choose by considering only rele-
vant information. For example, individuals gave markedly different
predictions of the grade point average (GPA) of a student who studies
three hours a week than they did for a student who studies thirty-one
80 See Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 65, at 560-62.
81 See Shelley E. Taylor, The Availability Bias in Social Perception and Interaction, inJUDc-
MENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 37, at 190, 197 (describing how cognitive structures
can lead the use of the availability heuristic to alter predictions by decisionmakers, and
giving as an example how predictions by academics and sports enthusiasts might differ).
82 See Leigh Ann Vaughn, Expertise and Use of Experienced Ease or Difficulty of
Recall for Social Judgments 68-71 (1998) (unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, University of Michi-
gan) (on file with author).
83 This is a particular way in which a decisionmaker's failure to appreciate the struc-
ture of the task facing her can make feedback irrelevant. See Einhorn, supra note 37, at
281-82.
84 Philip E. Tetlock & Richard Boettger, Accountability: A Social Magnifier of the Dilution
Effect, 57 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 388, 389 (1989).
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hours a week.85 However, the addition of irrelevant information, such
as the number of plants the student keeps, or whether the student
believes women should be free to choose abortion during the first
three months of pregnancy, caused individuals to modify their predic-
tions significantly.
8 6
The impact of irrelevant information in psychology experiments
demonstrating the dilution effect stems from two psychological phe-
nomena. The first phenomenon relates to the use of the cognitive
heuristic of representativeness: people "select or order outcomes by
the degree to which the outcomes represent the essential features of
the evidence."87 Thus, in the example of the prediction of a student's
GPA, a student who studies only three hours a week is more represen-
tative of a poor student than one who studies thirty-one hours a week.
When irrelevant information is introduced, however, the image that
the decisionmaker conjures up in making the prediction is no longer
as characteristic of the extreme predicted outcome for the simple rea-
son that the evidence is more complex.88 Keeping plants is indicative
of neither a good nor bad student, so that a student who keeps plants
and studies only three hours a week is not as representative of a bad
student as is a student who simply studies only three hours a week.
The representativeness heuristic causes the decisionmaker to moder-
ate his prediction. The second phenomenon stems from the norms of
social discourse. When a subject in an experiment is given a task by
the experimenter, he expects that the experimenter will provide hon-
est, relevant, and appropriately specific information.89 Therefore, a
decisionmaker will assume that all the information he is given will be
relevant to his task, and will try to take all the information into ac-
count in making his decision.90
The ramifications for agency rulemaking of the demonstrated
propensity of individuals to use irrelevant information is potentially
enormous. Agency staff must sift through enormous amounts of in-
formation relating to numerous aspects of the rule such as efficacy,
cost, uncertainty, and enforceability. 91 Much of the information that
staff will come across, including information provided by those who
85 Id.
86 Id.; Henry Zukier, The Dilution Effect: The Role of the Correlation and the Dispersion of
Predictor Variables in the Use of Nondiagnostic Information, 43 J. PERSONALrY & Soc. PSYCHOL.
1163, 1169 (1982).
87 Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On the Psychology of Prediction, in JUDGMENT
UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 37, at 48.
88 Philip E. Teflock et al., The Dilution Effect:Judgment Bias, Conversational Convention, or
a Bit of Both, 26 EuR. J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 915, 916 (1996).
89 Id. at 916-17.
90 See id.
91 See CORNELIUS M. KERWIN, RULEMAKING: How GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE LAW
AND MAKE POLICY 58-60 (2d ed. 1999).
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would be subject to the rule as well as those who stand to benefit from
it, will be irrelevant. The use of such information in formulating and
adopting a rule would seem to lead to unpredictably suboptimal regu-
lations.92 If the cause of the dilution effect, however, is the incorrect
assumption that the norms of social discourse apply in the experimen-
tal setting, then the effect is not likely to be significant in the agency
rulemaking context. Agency decisionmakers are not given a set of in-
formation that they presume to be relevant. Rather, they gather the
information that they consider relevant; to the extent agency staff
members obtain information from those with stakes in the outcome,
they understand that the information might be irrelevant and even
misleading.
93
One can also reasonably assume that expertise will mitigate the
consideration of irrelevant information. One of the attributes of ex-
pertise is the ability to filter relevant from irrelevant information.
Therefore, whatever the cause of the dilution effect, one would expect
experts to be significantly less susceptible to it than nonexperts.
Nonetheless, there is experimental evidence that even highly trained
experts are prone to rely on irrelevant information when making deci-
sions within their areas of special knowledge.
94
3. Biases that Do Not Correlate with Expertise
a. Confirmation Bias
Decisionmakers have a tendency to confirm an initial hypothesis
in the face of later-acquired disconfirming evidence, even though the
hypothesis may not have been based on substantial or reliable evi-
dence. 95 This bias manifests itself in the decisionmaker being prone
to search for information that confirms the hypothesis, as well as to
interpret information that he has as confirming the hypothesis.
96
92 "Obtaining accurate, relevant information constitutes the central problem for [an]
agency engaged in standard setting." STEPHEN G. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 103
(1982); cf KERWIN, supra note 91, at 102 (noting that the complexity of the information
that an agency needs "can be a serious obstacle to writing high-quality rules").
93 See BREwER, supra note 92, at 102-03 (noting that staff will seek to test the validity of
information it receives in comments on a proposed rule).
94 See Camerer & Johnson, supra note 73, at 351 (explaining that experts systemati-
cally use decisionmaking rules and cues that are not highly correlated with outcomes);
GaryJ. Gaeth & James Shanteau, Reducing the Influence of Irrelevant Information on Experienced
Decision Makers, inJUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING, supra note 72, at 305, 316 (describing
how expert soil judges were adversely influenced by irrelevant factors in evaluating soil
quality, but could be trained to ignore such factors).
95 See generally Dieter Frey, Recent Research on Selective Exposure to Information, in AD-
VANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 41, 42 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1986) (noting
that "people prefer information that supports their decisions ... and avoid information
that contradicts these cognitions").
96 Id. at 44; David M. Sanbonmatsu et al., Overestimating Causality: Attributional Effects of
Confirmatoy Processing, 65J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 892, 893 (1993). The tendency
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There are various cognitive explanations for the confirmation bias.
Confirming information search and analysis can reduce the disso-
nance that one might feel about the decision. 97 Simply forming a hy-
pothesis appears sufficient to trigger dissonance-reducing motivations
for information search and analysis.98 Confirming search and analysis
also allow an individual to maintain his cognitive schemas for organiz-
ing relevant information, while conflicting evidence and interpreta-
tions might require revamping those schemas.99  Hence, the
confirmation bias also helps reduce cognitive effort and provide clo-
sure regarding such organizing schemas.
The confirmation bias can cause a decisionmaker to be overconfi-
dent about his predictions. As already noted, overconfidence can lead
to regulations that misestimate the efficacy of a regulatory solution or
the feasibility and cost of compliance.100 In addition, the confirma-
tion bias can also lead a decisionmaker to attribute cause for events
erroneously. When testing an hypothesized cause, individuals often
restrict their consideration to conditions under which the event is hy-
pothesized to occur.1 1 This can mask a broader underlying cause for
the event.10 2 For example, a regulator may hypothesize that living
near hazardous waste storage facilities might contribute to heart dis-
ease. The regulator will then collect extensive evidence of the inci-
dence of heart disease for those living near such facilities and find
that it is significantly greater than for the population as a whole. It
still might be incorrect to conclude that proximity to such facilities
contributes to heart disease; for example, it may be that those living
near such facilities are poorer and less well educated about diet, and
that when one corrects for those factors, the incidence of heart dis-
ease for those living near hazardous waste facilities is not elevated.
The regulator would never discover the true cause of the greater inci-
dence of heart disease unless he broadened his set of potential causes
to include lower socioeconomic status.
to seek confirmation of a hypothesis, however, is complex; it can lead to a decisionmaker
searching for easily rebutted but seemingly conflicting evidence as well as confirming evi-
dence. See Frey, supra note 95, at 52-53.
97 See Frey, supra note 95, at 71-72; Stefan Schulz-Hardt et al., Biased Information Search
in Group Decision Making, 78J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 655, 655 (2000).
98 SeeJ. Edward Russo et al., The Distortion of Information DuringDecisions, 66 ORGANIZA-
TIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 102, 107 (1996); Schulz-Hardt et al., supra note
97, at 658.
99 See Frey supra note 95, at 72; Russo et al., supra note 98, at 108.
100 See supra text accompanying notes 91-93.




b. Attraction and Compromise Biases
Two other biases that affect individual decisionmaking are the at-
traction and compromise biases. Both reflect nonrational reactions to
the addition of options to a prior set of available outcomes. The at-
traction bias causes individuals to choose an alternative when the
available set of outcomes includes one that is close but inferior to one
of the initial choices. 10 3 The compromise bias causes individuals to
avoid choosing extreme outcomes.
10 4
According to rational choice theorists, any choice between out-
comes can be seen as being based on the values of the outcome in
terms of various attributes. For example, if one is choosing a camera,
one might evaluate it based on the quality of the pictures it is capable
of producing and the price.'0 5 Suppose that initially two choices are
available-a cheap camera that can take adequate pictures and a
more expensive camera capable of taking pictures of a high but not
professional quality. If one were to add to these choices a camera
capable of taking pictures of slightly lower quality than the cheap cam-
era but costing slightly more, that option should not affect the initial
choice between the initial alternatives. The added option is inferior
to the cheap camera both in terms of quality and price and hence
should be dismissed as irrelevant. In fact, however, the addition of
this rationally irrelevant option leads individuals to choose the cheap
camera more frequently than they would if they had only the initial
two choices as options. This is an illustration of the attraction bias;
the addition attracts decisionmakers to choose the outcome that
dominates the added outcome on both attributes.106
Consider again the initial choice between the cheap camera that
takes adequate pictures and the expensive camera that takes higher
quality pictures. Suppose that the decisionmaker is given a third op-
tion of purchasing a camera capable of taking professional grade pic-
tures but that is significantly more expensive than the initial high-
quality camera. Rationally, one would expect this choice to siphon off
some of the demand from the high-quality nonprofessional camera
103 SeeJoel Huber et al., Adding Asymmetrically Dominated Alternatives: Violations of Regu
larity and the Similarity Hypothesis, 9 J. CONSUMER RES. 90, 95-96 (1982); Itamar Simonson,
Choice Based on Reasons: The Case of Attraction and Compromise Effects, 16J. CONSUMER RES.
158, 160 (1989).
104 Simonson, supra note 103, at 161-62; Itamar Simonson & Amos Tversky, Choice in
Context: Tradeoff Contrast and Extremeness Aversion, 29 J. MARKETING RES. 281, 292 (1992).
105 This example is taken from one of the experiments reported in Eldar Shafir et al.,
Reason-Based Choice, in RESEARCH ON JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING, supra note 73, at 69,
82-84. For simplicity, the example assumes that the choice is based on only two attributes,
although there is no reason to assume that either the attraction or the compromise bias
would be any less prevalent in the more realistic situation where the choice is based on a
multitude of attributes.
106 Id. at 83.
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and to have little effect on the demand for the cheap camera. Some-
one who already decided the tradeoff in favor of price over quality
would be unlikely to be affected by the addition of an option provid-
ing higher quality at even greater price. In fact, studies show that the
addition of the professional-grade camera will cause an increase in the
demand for the high-grade camera-the compromise choice, so to
speak-relative to the cheap camera. 10 7
The attraction and compromise biases arise when choices involve
tradeoffs between non-commensurate attributes. 08 There are no ob-
jective means for choosing the correct tradeoff between one such at-
tribute and another. In the camera example above, the tradeoff
between quality and price depends on the individual's needs and pref-
erences for picture quality versus the goods that she could buy with
money saved by compromising that quality. Individuals, however,
often make such choices by reasoning about them; people try to come
up with arguments for why they should place greater weight on one
attribute than on another, and where to draw the line in trading off
such attributes. 10 9 The presence of an option that is clearly inferior to
one of the initial outcomes provides a reason for opting for that initial
outcome. Similarly, the presence of a more extreme outcome pro-
vides an argument that the tradeoff inherent in choosing an option
that is in the middle on scales for both attributes is reasonable be-
cause it does not entirely sacrifice one attribute for the other. Al-
though these biases have been established primarily in consumer
decisionmaking, similar context-based biases have been shown to af-
fect experts' decisions." 0
The attraction bias may have little impact on agency rulemaking
because regulatory options are not discrete choices that can be com-
pared pairwise to see if one dominates the other. The compromise
bias, however, has obvious implications for agency regulatory deci-
sions. An agency frequently must make tradeoffs between various reg-
ulatory values such as health benefits versus cost,"' enforceability
107 See id. at 82.
108 See Simonson, supra note 103, at 170.
109 See id.; see also Shafir et al., supra note 105, at 90 ("Having discarded the less attrac-
tive options and faced with a choice that is hard to resolve, people often search for a
compelling rationale for choosing one alternative over another.").
110 See Shafir et al., supra note 105, at 81 (reporting similar context-based biases in
decisions by expert physicians).
111 This tradeoff is the foundation of many of the environmental and occupational
health standards. See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EmcrIvE
RISK REGULATION 12-14 (1993) (contending that the cost per life saved by banning and
removing asbestos from buildings is too great); DANIEL A. FARBER, EcO-PRAGMATIsM: MAK-
ING SENSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 35-39 (1999) (discussing




versus flexibility,112 and certainty versus discretion.113 Moreover, bi-
ases that are due to reason-based decisionmaking, such as the compro-
mise bias, are likely to be more pronounced for a regulator because
he makes choices based on criteria provided to him by others. In that
situation, the decisionmaker cannot rely on his subjective preferences
about the various attributes of the choices to make the decision, but
instead must be able to explain the decision in terms of the specified
criteria.
Nonetheless, the compromise effect may be of limited signifi-
cance in many rulemaking proceedings because the various interest
groups who participate in the proceedings often will advocate for ex-
treme choices on opposite sides of the spectrum of attributes that the
regulator must trade off.1 14 In the vast majority of cases, the optimal
regulation will lie somewhere between the most extreme positions
available to an agency. Thus, while the compromise bias is likely to
occur in staff deliberations, the propensity to avoid extreme outcomes
may not cause agencies to adopt significantly suboptimal rules due to
the adversarial nature of rulemaking proceedings.
II
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ACCOUNTABILITY AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
Psychological studies suggest that accountability, if properly struc-
tured, can significantly improve the quality of decisionmaking in the
sense of minimizing the extent to which individuals unthinkingly rely
on inappropriate decisionmaking rules or fall prey to psychological
biases.115 Accountability, however, is not always beneficial, and is
never a complete panacea for decisionmaking ills. In the context of
judicial review, one must first see if the psychological studies of ac-
112 This tradeoff is at the heart of the debate about replacing design standards with
performance standards. Performance standards can allow regulated entities significant lee-
way to comply in the most efficient manner, see Richard B. Stewart, Models forEnvironmental
Regulation: Central Planning Versus Market-Based Approaches, 19 B.C. ENVT. AeF. L. REv. 547,
556-57 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Congress, Constitutional Moments, and the Cost-Benefit State;
48 STAN. L. REv. 247, 267-68 (1996), but design standards are much easier to enforce, see
Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform Standards and
"Fine-Tuning" Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1267, 1271 (1985) (identifying "numer-
ous advantages of uniform standards in comparison with more particularized and flexible
regulatory strategies").
113 See KENNETH CULP DAVIs, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 52-56 (Illini Books ed. 1971);
Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65, 70-71 (1983);
Henry J. Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies: The Need for Better Definition of Stan-
dards, 75 HARV. L. REv. 863, 872-74 (1962).
114 See Mark Seidenfeld, Empowering Staheholders: Limits on Collaboration as the Basis for
Flexible Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REv. 411, 439, 441-43 (2000) (arguing that interest
group structures and dynamics will lead some groups to advocate extreme positions).
115 See generally Jennifer S. Lerner & Philip E. Tetlock, Accounting for the Effects of Ac-
countability, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 255 (1999) (offering a comprehensive review of the psy-
chological literature on accountability).
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countability, which deal primarily with oversight of individual deci-
sionmaking, have any relevance to complex institutional
decisionmaking like agency rulemaking. Second, there are structural
prerequisites if accountability is to improve rather than impair
decisonmaking. Third, even propitiously structured accountability
does not improve all aspects of decisionmaking; there are some biases
that accountability actually amplifies. Thus, before concluding that
judicial review is likely to improve rulemaking decisions, it is necessary
first to describe the nature of accountability, as that term is under-
stood by psychologists; second, to analyze whether judicial review pro-
vides a meaningful and beneficial mechanism for accountability; and,
third, to address the effects of such review on particular biases that
afflict the rulemaking process.
A. Judicial Review as Accountability
Although psychological studies do not contain a uniform defini-
tion of "accountability," their uses of that term all conform to the fol-
lowing broad core concept: "[A] ccountability refers to the implicit or
explicit expectation that one may be called on to justify one's beliefs,
feelings, and actions to others. Accountability also usually implies that
people who do not provide a satisfactory justification for their actions
will suffer negative consequences ... "116 Those consequences need
not be material; contemptuous glances or even feelings of disappoint-
ment in one's own performance may suffice. 117 From this broad no-
tion of accountability it follows that the audience need not know as
much about the subject as the decisionmaker; accountability can im-
prove the care that decisionmakers take and alleviate decisionmaking
biases-even if the audience is less knowledgeable and subject to the
same biases that plague the decisionmaker.
Judicial review provides accountability, within the core psycholog-
ical concept, because under "hard-look" review courts examine the ar-
guments pertaining to the validity and care of the agency reasoning in
adopting the rule. 118 Hence, the reviewing court provides an audi-
116 Id. at 255 (citation omitted).
117 See id. (noting accountability can be based on "disdainful looks"); cf. BERtNARDn
GUERIN, SocLAJ FAcILITA ION 164 (1993) (reporting that one mechanism explaining why
individuals perform differently when in front of a nonevaluative audience is an attempt to
"reduce any discrepancy between the internalized social norm [of performing well] and
current behaviour"); Kate Szymanski & Stephen G. Harkins, Social Loafing and Self-Evalua-
tion with a Social Standard, 53J. PERSONALUY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 891, 891, 894 (1987) (demon-
strating that an individual's ability to evaluate his own performance by comparing his
performance to a social standard was a sufficient motivation to alleviate "social loafing").
118 See Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals to Modify
Judicial Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 Tax. L. Ray. 483, 491-92 (1997).
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ence, albeit not the only audience," 9 for those engaged in formulat-
ing and defending the rule. Courts can express their disapproval by
reversing and remanding the rule if they find the arguments ill-rea-
soned or lacking support, and such disapproval is likely to have some
negative ramifications for agency staff involved in the rulemaking pro-
cess. The ramifications may be material: although a staff member who
worked on the rule rarely will be deprived of a promotion or lose her
job because a rule is overturned, she may be required to return to
modifying the rule and developing arguments for defending it anew
well after she had gone on to other projects. 120 This disruption, cou-
pled with an obligation to return to issues that the member thought
already resolved, can have a demoralizing effect. 121 Moreover, others
on the staff might think less highly of a member who they see as re-
sponsible for the reversal of a rule, and an individual who attributes
the loss in court to her contributions is very likely be disappointed by
the judicial reaction to her efforts.
Nonetheless, the institutional nature of rulemaking decisions
does raise questions about whether arbitrary and capricious review is
likely to influence the quality of decisionmaking by individual staff
members. The formulation and ultimate adoption of agency rules
usually reflects the product of a staff work group, not some mere ag-
gregation of individual decisions.' 22 In addition, the staff group does
not have the authority to choose the proposed rule or to promulgate
the final rule. That authority generally rests with the agency head.
The staff only provides its recommendations along with analyses sup-
porting the recommendations and indicating potential weaknesses
and alternatives to the recommendation. 123 These two attributes of
the rulemaking process have a potential impact on judicial review as a
mechanism for accountability.
Accountability appears to influence decisionmakers' motivations:
individuals seek to please their audience and to convince the audi-
ence that they have done a good job in reaching a decision. Litera-
ture on "social loafing" indicates that individuals' motivations,
119 See Daniel Cohen & Peter L. Strauss, Congressional Review of Agency Regulations, 49
ADMIN. L. REv. 95, 96-102 (1997) (describing legislative fast-track review of agency rules);
Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARv. L. R~v. 2245, 2257-60 (describing theo-
ries of congressional oversight of agency rulemaking); id. at 2285-90 (discussing President
Clinton's program for Office of Management and Budget review of agency rules).
120 SeeJerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, Regulation and Legal Culture: The Case of Motor
Vehicle Safety, 4 YALE J. ON REC. 257, 295 (1987) ("Any remand occurs long after the
rulemaking docket has been closed and the staff has been reassigned.").
121 See Pierce, supra note 15, at 26-27.
122 KERWIN, supra note 91, at 81-82; McGarity, supra note 8, at 90-91; William F. Peder-
sen, Jr., Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38, 52-55 (1975).
123 See Pedersen, supra note 122, at 56-57 (noting that the role of the staff work group
at the EPA leaves resolution of controversial issues to political appointees in the agency).
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however, are diminished when their efforts go towards a group prod-
uct.' 24 That same literature also suggests that social loafing in-
creases-that is, motivation decreases-when a decisionmaker does
not have the authority to make the ultimate decision and only can
make a recommendation. 125 Nonetheless, there are other attributes
of staff involvement in the rulemaking process which would tend to
increase individual staff members' motivaiions.
Social loafing occurs when an individual participates in produc-
ing a group product; such loafing has been established in the context
of group decisionmaking. 126 But identifiability-the ability to identify
the contribution of an individual to the final product-alleviates so-
cial loafing.127 Although each agency has its own wrinkles on the pro-
cess for formulating and adopting a rule, because of the prospect of
judicial review, all such processes involve staff members from each af-
fected office within an agency assessing the rule from their unique
professional perspectives. 128 The contributions of members from dif-
ferent offices within the agency rarely overlap. A health scientist may
analyze the likely benefits of a health-based rule, an engineer might
assess the technical feasibility of compliance with the rule, and an
economist will prepare cost studies and provide economic analyses of
the impact of the rule. Although the ultimate decision will reflect all
of these inputs, it will often be possible for other staff members who
worked on the rule and their supervisors to identify the individual
member whose analysis was responsible for or justifies a particular
portion of the proposed rule. Moreover, when the rule is finally
adopted, this same group will provide the reasoning that the courts
will review, and a judicial determination that some aspect of the
agency reasoning is somehow inadequate can easily be associated with
124 See Bibb Latan6 et al., Many Hands Make Light the Work: The Causes and Consequences
of Social Loafing, 37J. PERSONALrY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 822, 830 (1979) (describing social
loafing as caused by a decrease in social pressure to perform); Kenneth H. Price, Decision
Responsibility, Task Responsibility, Identifiability and Social Loafing, 40 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV.
& Hum. DECISION PROCESSES 330, 330-31 (1987) (reporting that social loafing occurs in
tasks requiring cognitive effort).
125 See Price, supra note 124, at 337.
126 See Stephen G. Harkins & Richard E. Petty, Effects of Task Difficulty and Task Unique-
ness on Social Loafing, 43 J. PERSONALrTY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1214, 1218-19 (1982) (demon-
strating social loafing in brainstorming tasks); Elizabeth Weldon & Gina M. Gargano,
Cognitive Effort in Additive Task Groups: The Effects of Shared Responsibility on the Quality of
Multiattribute Judgments, 36 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & Hum. DECISION PROCESSES 348,
359-60 (1985) (finding social loafing in evaluation of the desirability ofjobs based on job
descriptions).
127 Kipling Williams et al., Identifiability as a Deterrent to Social Loafing- Two Cheering Ex-
periments, 40J. PERSONALIY & SOC. PSYCHOL 303, 307 (1981).
128 Staff members from various offices may be included in the team that formulates
the initial draft of rule, or may be limited to reviewing the draft after it is produced but




the individual staff member who provided it.129 Hence, although the
formulation of a rule is a group effort, the actions of individual mem-
bers are highly identifiable.
Similarly, the tendency of a decisionmaker acting as part of a
merely advisory group to be less motivated to perform well and there-
fore to loaf can be offset if the individual's contribution to the prod-
uct is unique, and if the group member feels that she can influence
the final decision, and, therefore, is not dispensable.130 In the context
of rulemaking, individual staff members' contributions generally are
unique and, at least if the agency faces meaningful judicial scrutiny,
indispensable.13 1 The critique of staffs contribution has been that
the professionals may limit the discretion of political appointees too
greatly, rather than that the contribution of the professionals has too
little impact.'3 2 Because the contributions of staff members assigned
to a rulemaking are highly identifiable and significantly influence the
ultimate decision, there is good reason to believe that judicial review
provides meaningful motivation for such members.
B. Prerequisites for Beneficial Accountability
Not all accountability improves decisionmaking. Psychologically,
accountability works by motivating a decisionmaker to please his audi-
ence. 133 In some instances, however, other cognitive and social moti-
vations outweigh this desire to please, and they can exacerbate poor-
quality decisionmaking. In other instances, the desire to please the
audience can introduce biases into the decisionmaking process. The
most complete review of the literature on the psychology of accounta-
bility suggests that for accountability to improve the quality of deci-
sionmaking it must satisfy the following four prerequisites: (1) the
decisionmaker must be aware that he will have to explain his decision
129 The identifiability of issues addressed in judicial review and the contributions of
individual staff members is implicit in William Pedersen's assertion that "inquir[y] into the
minute details of methodology, data sufficiency and test procedure" will "give those who
care about well-documented and well-reasoned decisionmaking a lever with which to move
those who do not." Pedersen, supra note 122, at 60; see also, e.g., R. SHEP MELNICK, REGULA-
TION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR Acr 270-72 (1983) (noting that the
EPA's airborne lead standard of 1.5 micrograms per cubic centimeter originated in the
agency's Office of Research and Development, and was generated by a determination by
the office "to do it right this time" after being criticized by the agency's Science Advisory
Board for its initial sloppy work).
130 See Price, supra note 124, at 331, 342-43; see also Harkins & Petty, supra note 126, at
1228 (reporting that social loafing is a function of participants' feeling that their efforts
were not needed).
131 As one scholar in public administration has noted: "[I]n the end it is professionals
who are at the growing edge of policy. It is their skills that give agencies their problem-
solving capacities... ." ROURKE, supra note 38, at 117.
132 See McGarity, supra note 8, at 92.
133 Simonson & Nye, supra note 74, at 441.
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prior to making any irrevocable commitments to that decision; (2) he
must perceive the audience to which he explains the decision as legiti-
mate; (3) he must not know the identity of the audience that will hear
his explanation; and (4) he must believe that the basis for the audi-
ence's evaluation of the decision will be process- rather than outcome-
based. 3
4
1. Awareness of Accountability when Making a Decision
If an individual first commits to a course of action and only later
learns that he will have to explain that course, both cognitive disso-
nance and the desire to create a good impression will spur that indi-
vidual tojustify decisions already made rather than to expend effort to
reconsider those decisions.13 5 An individual will try to defend the de-
cision already made to avoid feeling a conflict between the ultimate
decision and his behavior. 36 The person will also not want to appear
hypocritical or inconsistent. Therefore, if accountability is to improve
an ultimate decision, the decisionmaker must be aware that he will be
held accountable prior to making a commitment.
Agency rules generally are subject to judicial review, under either
provisions of the statute authorizing the rule or the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA).13 7 Agency staff working on a rule, from the
very beginning of the process, are aware that the rule may be reviewed
by a court. Whether a rule is actually reviewed depends on whether
any person brings ajudicial challenge. Hence, unlike the psychologi-
cal experiments studying accountability, which vary only in the timing
of when a decisionmaker learns that he will have to explain a decision,
judicial review of agency rulemaking is an ever-present but uncertain
threat. Although psychological study of the prospect of uncertain ac-
countability would be helpful, in its absence one can surmise that the
reported influence of accountability is likely to occur if the deci-
sionmaker perceives that judicial review is probable, and likely dimin-
ishes as the perceived probability of review decreases.'38 In addition,
if the impact of reversal is sufficiently great to warrant attention to
even an uncertain threat of judicial review, then the staff working on
the rulemaking will be concerned with pleasing the court well before
they know for certain whether review will occur.
134 See Lerner & Tetlock, supra note 115, at 256-59.
135 See id. at 257.
136 See PLOUS, supra note 42, at 28-29 (noting that cognitive dissonance can affect be-
havior after a person commits to a decision).
137 JEFFREY S. LUBBERS, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING 280 (3d ed. 1998).
138 See Mark Seidenfeld, Playing Games with the Timing ofJudicial Review: An Evaluation of
Proposals to Restrict Pre-enforcement Review of Agency Rules, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 85, 116-17 (1997)
(arguing that the impact of judicial review on the quality of agency rulemaking will in-
crease as the likelihood of review increases).
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The likelihood that a rule will be challenged varies from agency
to agency and even from rule to rule, but even the most significant
rules adopted by an agency like the EPA, whose rules are considered
controversial and therefore likely to invite challenge, are challenged
less than half the time.13 9 Yet, there is a general perception, shared by
those who study judicial review of administrative rules and those in
the agencies, that most rules are subject to challenge. 140 Moreover,
the critics of judicial review paint a picture of a rulemaking process
that is geared primarily to parrying the threat ofjudicial review, which
is consistent with a perception that such review is sufficiently likely to
warrant attention.141 Thus, there is good reason to believe that
rulemaking staff at many agencies do worry from the outset about
pleasing a court should the rule be challenged, and therefore do not
commit to an outcome before taking such review into account.
Of course, there are exceptions. In particular, the thrust of some
rules, if not the details, are preordained. This is especially true when
an agency institutes a rulemaking proceeding to satisfy demands for a
particular outcome from the White House or political appointees at
the top of the agency.' 42 In such cases, the agency has committed to
139 At the EPA, somewhere between 3% and 25% of all rules and about 33% of major
rules are challenged in court. See discussion supra note 78.
140 See Coglianese, supra note 78, at 1296 (reporting that it is widely believed that virtu-
ally every EPA rule is challenged in court); Mashaw, supra note 7, at 226-29 (presenting a
hypothetical game purporting to show that allowing regulated entities to challenge a rule
prior to enforcement means that the probability is great that some entity will challenge the
rule); Seidenfeld, supra note 138, at 88-94 (generalizing Mashaw's game demonstrating
the significant incentives that both regulated entities and regulatory beneficiaries have to
challenge rules before they are enforced); see also Thomas 0. McGarity, The Courts and the
Ossification of Rulemaking: A Response to Professor Seidenfed 75 TEX. L. REV. 525, 535 & n.41
(1997) (asserting that "[flor most major federal rulemaking initiatives, the cost ... to
launch a blunderbuss attack [in court] on the agency's analysis and conclusions is modest
compared to the costs of compliance with the rule"); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to
Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59, 69 (1995) (contending that a party dissat-
isfied with an agency rule will always be able to find some flaw in the rulemaking process
that gives rise to about a fifty-percent chance of succeeding in an arbitrary and capricious
judicial challenge).
141 See JOHN M. MENDELOFF, THE DILEMMA OF Toxic SUBSTANCE REGULATION: How
OVERREGULATION CAUSES UNDERREGULATION AT OSHA 121-22 (1988); McGarity, supra
note 15, at 1412; Melnick, supra note 14, at 247; see also E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing
Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490, 1492-93 (1992) (asserting that the primary purpose for
notice and comment procedures is to allow an agency to "compile a record for judicial
review"); Pierce, supra note 140, at 67 (claiming that agencies make decisions and then
spend vast resources coming up with reasons to justify those decisions).
142 For example, this seems to have been the case for President Reagan's Department
of Health and Human Services's gag rule prohibiting family planning clinics receiving fed-
eral funds from counseling clients regarding abortion. See Statutory Prohibition on Use of
Appropriated Funds in Programs Where Abortion Is a Method of Family Planning; Stan-
dard of Compliance for Family Planning Services Projects, 53 Fed. Reg. 2922 (Feb. 2,
1988). The proposal for that regulation had been announced by President Reagan before
the rulemaking proceeding began in an apparent attempt to shore up the support of the
religious right for the candidacy of then-Vice President George H. Bush. Mark Seidenfeld,
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the gist of the rule even before the proceeding is done, and the staffs
job is merely to come up with data and arguments to support the pre-
determined outcome. This is precisely what the psychology literature
predicts will happen when a commitment precedes decisionmaking
subject to review. 143 Thus, for such rules, judicial review is likely to
result in efforts to bolster the position already taken rather than to
improve the quality of decisionmaking.
2. Perception of the Legitimacy of the Audience
A decisionmaker held accountable to an audience that he does
not consider legitimate tends not to take the same care in making his
decision as does one who is accountable to a legitimate audience.144
Decisionmakers tend to consider audiences illegitimate when there is
simply no plausible reason for that audience to review the decision.
45
For example, when individuals had to explain a betting decision to a
friend, they were more careful in making the decision than when they
had to explain the decision to a stranger.' 46 In addition, when a deci-
sionmaker is subject to surveillance that he perceives as intended to
control his beliefs, accountability can actually cause the deci-
sionmaker to defend his beliefs more vigorously.
147
There is no evidence, however, that agency staff considers judicial
review to be illegitimate oversight. Courts are authorized by the APA
to engage in arbitrary and capricious review.' 48 Legal commentators
sometimes complain that the hard-look review of today is a far cry
from the minimal rationality standard envisioned when the APA was
passed. 149 From the perspective of agency staff members, however,
hard-look review provides the only oversight that focuses on the valid-
ity of their input into the rulemaking process-the detailed analysis
and arguments based on the data in the record.' 50 Judicial review
provides staff with a "lever" to influence their superiors, who tend to
react primarily to political concerns. 151 Thus, although staff members
may think that courts often make mistakes when reviewing agency
A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in ReviewingAgency Interpretations
of Statutes, 73 TEx. L. REv. 83, 101-02 (1994).
143 See Lerner & Teflock, supra note 115, at 257.
144 Id. at 258.
145 Id.
146 George Cvetkovich, Cognitive Accommodation, Language, and Social Responsibility, 41
Soc. PSYCHOL. 149, 154 (1978).
147 Lerner & Tetock, supra note 115, at 258-59.
148 See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000).
149 See, e.g., Cross, Shattering the Fragile Case supra note 17, at 1246-47 & n.5; McGarity,
supra note 15, at 1410-12.
150 See Pedersen, supra note 122, at 59.
151 See id. at 60.
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rules, the focus of arbitrary and capricious review is likely to reinforce
the legitimacy of that review in the eyes of agency staff.
3. Decisionmakers' Knowledge of Their Audience
Accountability tends to enhance the quality of decisionmaking
only if the decisionmaker is not aware of the identity of the audience
to whom he must report. When individuals are accountable to an au-
dience whose own preferences are revealed, these individuals do not
engage in more complex thought about their decision tasks. Instead
they alter the outcome of their decisions to come closer to an out-
come that would satisfy their audience. 15 2 In some situations, deci-
sionmakers modify their choices in a manner that is obviously
inefficient in order to avoid an outcome that they might find unpleas-
ant to explain to their audience. 153 Individuals who are accountable
to an audience with unknown views are significantly more self-critical
while making their decisions. 154 They are more open to qualifying
decisions about which they are uncertain. 155 When individuals are ac-
countable to an audience whose preferences are not revealed, they
sometimes make a "best guess" about the outcomes that the audience
would prefer and then alter their decisions to conform better with
such surmised preferences. 156 Thus, the ideal scenario for accounta-
bility to enhance the quality of decisionmaking would keep the iden-
tity of the audience hidden from the decisionmaker.
This is precisely how judicial review operates. When an agency
promulgates a rule, it has little idea who the individual judges who will
review the rule will be. In fact, this lack of knowledge has been the
foundation of much criticism ofjudicial review. Some critics contend
that because the agency cannot know the predilections of the judges
who will review the decision, it will engage in extreme efforts to bol-
152 See Richard Klimoski & Lawrence Inks, Accountability Forces in Performance Appraisa
45 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 194, 202-03 (1990); Philip E.
Tedock, Accountability and Complexity of Thought, 45 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 74,
80-81 (1983); Philip E. Tetlock et al., Social and Cognitive Strategies for Coping with Accounta-
bility: Conformity, Complexity, and Bolstering, 57 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 632, 638
(1989).
153 For example, individuals who were told that they were responsible for awarding
financial aid to students who would have to drop out of school if they did not receive
sufficient aid, and whose budget was not sufficient to provide aid to all applicants, tended
to award insufficient funds to all the applicants when they were accountable to those appli-
cants. Sheldon Adelberg & C. Daniel Batson, Accountability and Helping: When Needs Exceed
Resources, 36J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 343, 347-48 (1978). Even when individuals
were accountable to the provider of funds rather than the recipients, they were more apt to
award insufficient funds to some of the applicants. Id.
154 See Tetlock, supra note 152, at 80-81.
155 See Philip E. Tetlock & Richard Boettger, Accountability Amplifies the Status Quo Effect
when Change Creates Victims, 7J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING, 1, 18 (1994).
156 See Tetlock, supra note 152, at 80.
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ster its decision. These critics describe agencies as searching for and
analyzing information that they consider irrelevant just to satisfy the
possibility that some judge on a panel reviewing the rule will think the
information significant.157 Others postulate that an agency will be-
come disheartened by the uncertainty of having to prepare for review
by an unknown judge whose perspective on the issues in the case can-
not be ascertained. These critics predict that "[r]ather than try to
guess what a court will require, the agency simply may choose to issue
a less thoughtful rule and accept the inevitability of judicial second-
guessing." 158 In fact, the psychology of accountability suggests that
the very uncertainty about the likely views of the reviewing judge that
critics bemoan is a necessary antidote to decisionmakers' tendencies
to tailor their decisions to the views of their prospective audiences.
4. Process- Versus Outcome-Based Accountability
For accountability to be beneficial, a decisionmaker must per-
ceive that the evaluation of her decision will be based on the process
that she used to reach the decision, rather than on the outcome of the
decision. 159 For example, in a study testing the propensity of business
administration students to be influenced by sunk costs when recom-
mending in which of two products a company should invest, students
who believed that their recommendations would be evaluated based
on whether their decision turned out to be the most beneficial for the
company inappropriately escalated commitments to prior invest-
ments. 160 Students who were informed that they would be evaluated
based on their use of effective decision strategies-strategies the stu-
dents would have to report in an interview immediately following the
decision-were significantly less likely to succumb to the sunk cost fal-
lacy. 161 In another example, buyers who were held accountable for
the process by which they reached their decisions analyzed informa-
tion more extensively than they did when not accountable at all, or
only accountable for decision outcomes.'
62
157 See Elliott, supra note 141, at 1492-93; McGarity, supra note 15, at 1412; Melnick,
supra note 14, at 247.
158 Cross, Pragmatic Pathologies, supra note 17, at 1047.
159 Lemer & Tetlock, supra note 115, at 258.
160 Simonson & Staw, supra note 74, at 423-24.
161 See id.
162 See Patricia M. Doney & Gary M. Armstrong, Effects of Accountability on Symbolic Infor-
mation Search and Information Analysis by Organizational Buyers, 24 J. AcA.o. MARKETING SCI.
57, 61-62 (1996). Interestingly, Doney and Armstrong found that neither process nor
outcome accountability significantly increased the likelihood that buyers would engage in
symbolic search-searches for information to justify decisions they already made. Id. Al-
though lack of significance does not prove that such review has no impact on symbolic
search, it does suggest that critics of judicial review overemphasize the tendency of hard-
look review to induce defensive searches for information that confirms the decision the
agency would have made without the information. Doney and Armstrong's findings also
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On its face, arbitrary and capricious review, as currently imple-
mented under the "hard-look" or "relevant factors" rubric,1 63 is almost
entirely a process-based evaluation. 164 It does not compare the out-
come to some ideal that the judge has in mind, and eschews inquiring
whether the agency decision, in fact, turned out to be wise. 165 It es-
sentially asks the agency to explain why it reached the outcome it did
in light of data available to the agency, alternatives to the outcome,
and arguments presented to the agency by those whom the rule will
affect.166
That the arbitrary and capricious standard of review appears to
be process-based does not necessarily mean that it is so. The legal
standard may be sufficiently indeterminate that a judge who purports
to base a decision on application of such a standard really might be
basing his decision on ideology rather than on the relevant legal argu-
ments. In the agency context, ideological judicial voting translates
into upholding regulatory outcomes that judges like and reversing
those that they dislike. In other words, ifjudges vote entirely based on
ideology and ignore legal doctrine, except in writing opinions at-
tempting to justify decisions already made, then judicial review is
based on outcome rather than on process.
The jury is still out on the extent to which judges vote based on
ideology in various contexts. Although a recent study concludes that
suggest that critics of political review, which is outcome-based, may overstate the extent to
which political oversight encourages symbolic search. See generally Mark Seidenfeld, The
Psychology of Accountability and Political Review of Agency Rules, 51 DuKE L.J. (forthcoming
Dec. 2001) (using the psychology of accountability to analyze the likely impact of political
oversight on agency rulemaking).
163 The hard-look test requires the court to scrutinize the agency's reasoning to make
certain that the agency carefully deliberated about the issues raised by its decision. Harold
Levanthal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 509, 511
(1974). This test was first enunciated as an approach for assessing whether an agency
decision is arbitrary and capricious in Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841,
851 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Although the Supreme Court has not used the talismanic phrase
"hard look," its decision in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43-44 (1983), which requires an agency to examine relevant
data, articulate a satisfactory explanation connecting facts found to the agency's regulatory
choice, and consider all important aspects of problems addressed by the agency decision, is
widely regarded as having adopted something akin to the hard-look standard. See, e.g.,
McGarity, supra note 140, at 527 & n.9.
164 Gary Lawson, Outcome, Procedure and Process: Agency Duties of Explanation for Legal
Conclusions, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 313, 316-19 (1996); Mark Seidenfeld, An ApologyforAdmin-
istrative Law in The Contracting State, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 215, 222 (2000); Cass R.
Sunstein, Deregulation and the Hard-Look Doctrine, 1983 Sup. CT. REV. 177, 181-84.
165 See, e.g., Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S.
519, 552-54 (1978) (reversing a lower court decision requiring the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission to consider conservation as an alternative to construction of a power plant,
noting that conservation began to be seen as a feasible alternative only after the agency's
decision).
166 Seidenfeld, supra note 118, at 491-92.
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ideology is not a significant factor in judicial review of agency deci-
sions,167 most studies conclude the opposite. 168 There are, however,
several limitations on these conclusions. First, it is difficult to code
the outcomes of judicial decisions in an objective manner. Agency
decisions tend to be complex; cases may raise multiple issues and the
various methods by which studies treat the resolution of these issues
fail to capture accurately the outcome of every case. For example,
suppose a challenge to an EPA rule raises six issues. One might count
a reversal and remand of any one issue as a loss for the agency. This
might be appropriate if the issues all related to the validity of the rule
as a whole, because then reversal on one ground usually will result in
the rule being vacated and remanded, which in turn will ultimately
delay the adoption of the rule, and potentially could kill the rule alto-
gether.169 But if the rule is really a conglomerate of six independent
rules, as, for example, when a rule sets treatment limits for six differ-
ent hazardous wastes, then reversal of one limit would still leave the
other five intact. In such a case, it would be perverse to claim that the
agency lost the case. In fact, the agency should be credited with win-
ning five cases and losing one. Therefore, studies that treat an entire
case as the unit for analysis and studies that treat each issue as the unit
of analysis are both imperfect.
170
167 SeeWilliam S. Jordan, III,Judges, Ideology, and Policy in the Administrative State: Lessons
from a Decade of Hard Look Remands of EPA Rules, 53 ADMIN. L. REv. 45, 98-99 (2001).
168 E.g., Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal
Doctrine: Whistleblowingon the Federal Courts ofAppeals, 107YA L.J. 2155, 2175 (1998); Rich-
ard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REv. 1717,
1766-67 (1997); see also Roy W. McLeese III, Note, Disagreement in D.C.: The Relationship
Between t1w Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit and Its Implications for a National Court of Ap-
peals, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1048, 1050-51 (1984) (identifying ideological incompatibility as
the "most obvious explanation" for the D.C. Circuit's low affirmation rate before the Su-
preme Court).
169 The impact of remand on agency decisions can be disastrous because, at the very
least, it takes significant time and resources for the agency to reinstate the rule. See
MAsH~w & HARFsr, supra note 14, at 88-92, 125-29 (describing how the delay created by
remand on a tangential issue in the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's regu-
lation of alrbags not only allowed changing politics to derail its airbag rule, but also con-
tributed to changing the entire manner in which the agency operated, from promulgating
safety standards to issuing recalls of unsafe vehicles). Even if the issues relate to the validity
of the rule as a whole, there are bound to be differences in the impact that the reversal of
each issue would have on the agency's ability to re-promulgate the rule or to promulgate
other rules with a similar ideological foundation. SeeJordan, supra note 167, at 51-54. If
the court simply demands better explanation, an agency might be able to re-promulgate
the rule quickly and without change. SeeJordan, supra note 19, at 415-17 (describing how
agencies "recover" from remands of rules). If the reversal requires extensive collection of
data that the agency does not possess, it may be impossible for the agency to re-promulgate
the rule.
170 Compare, e.g., Revesz, supra note 168, at 1727 & n.29 (treating the vote on each case
as a single judicial decision), with Jordan, supra note 167, at 54, 56 (treating the vote on
each issue raised in a case as a separate judicial decision).
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Second, studies that conclude that ideology plays a role in judicial
decisionmaking do not demonstrate that the doctrine surrounding
the arbitrary and capricious test and the care an agency takes in
promulgating a rule are irrelevant. The fact that a variable in a regres-
sion is statistically significant says little about either the magnitude of
the impact of that variable 71 or the significance of other variables. 17
2
Because none of the reported studies included the adherence to legal
doctrine as an independent variable, they say nothing about the signif-
icance, let alone the relative importance, of the care of the agency's
decision versus the ideology of the judges in the outcomes of arbitrary
and capricious challenges.
Despite these difficulties, those who have looked at the impact of
ideology on judicial review of agency action generally conclude that
both legal doctrine and a judge's ideology affect how that judge is
likely to vote in a particular case. 173 They reach this conclusion by
analyses showing that monitoring of judges' judicial review of agency
action by the Supreme Court and by other judges on the appellate
panel reduces the impact of ideology on judges' voting.1 74
Scholars who have addressed the issue of the interplay of ideology
and law in influencing judicial review of agency action have proposed
two different mechanisms for how these factors enter judges' deci-
sions. One mechanism posits that judges weigh their ideological pref-
171 See ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, ECONOMETRIC MODELS AND EcO-
NOMIC FoRECASTs 63-64 (2d ed. 1981).
172 None of the studies assessing the impact of ideology on judicial review included a
variable representing either the impact of legal doctrine or the care of agency decision-
making in their analyses. This probably reflects the difficulty of objectively coding such
variables. SeeJEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLDJ. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATrru-
DINAL MODEL 33-34 (1993) (asserting in general that the legal model of decisionmaking
cannot be objectively operationalized in an empirical study); Tracey E. George, Developing
a Positive Theory of Decisionmaking on U.S. Courts of Appeals, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1635, 1653
(1998) (claiming that "inherent impediments to the creation of a functional model [that
incorporates legal factors] across doctrinal areas have limited.., efforts to... map judi-
cial outcomes").
173 E.g., Cross & Tiller, supra note 168, at 2175; Revesz, supra note 168, at 1766-68. But
seeJordan, supra note 167, at 99 (arguing that his data do not support hypothesis of strate-
gic ideological voting, but not performing any statistical analyses to separate out other
factors that could mask such ideological voting). The problem of evaluating the relative
impact of law vis-d-vis a judge's ideology on the voting by that judge extends beyond judi-
cial review of agency action. The only statistical analysis of which I am aware that explicitly
evaluated the impact of legal doctrine and extra legal factors such as ideology found that
both types of factors influenced Supreme Court Justices' votes in death penalty cases. See
Tracey E. George & Lee Epstein, On the Nature of Supreme Court Decision Making, 86 Am. POL.
Scl. REv. 323, 333-34 (1992). But cf SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 172, at 72-73 (concluding
from their subjective evaluation of Supreme CourtJustices' politics that all Supreme Court
decisions are determined by such politics rather than law). Professor George's findings are
consistent with administrative law studies that deduce this same conclusion.




erences against other preferences, such as their reputations as careful
jurists.175 The second asserts thatjudges' ideology enters indirectly by
influencing the meaning that judges give to legal doctrine and in-
forming judges about the appropriate application of that doctrine.
176
Under either theory of judging, both law and ideology will influence
judicial decisions. In other words, for most cases in which an agency
rule is challenged as arbitrary and capricious, ajudge who prefers the
substance of the rule is more likely to vote to uphold it than is ajudge
who prefers the status quo prior to the rule for any given level of care
manifested in the agency's justification for the rule. By the same to-
ken, however, in most cases an agency justification that is comprehen-
sive, careful, and persuasive is more likely to convince a judge of any
ideological bent to affirm the agency than is justification that is identi-
fiably careless, incomplete, and unpersuasive.
177
To the best of my knowledge, the psychological research does not
report any experiments in which accountability was based on a combi-
nation of process and outcome. As noted above, however, when deci-
sionmakers know the views of their audience they skew their decisions
towards outcomes that will please the audience regardless of whether
accountability is nominally process-based. They even go so far as to try
to ascertain the outcome preferences of a known audience when the
actual preferences are unknown. That is why accountability works
best when the identity of the audience is unknown.' 78 Thus, the psy-
chological studies of accountability suggest that decisionmakers sub-
175 See Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Judicial Incentives and Indeterminacy in Sub-
stantive Review of Administrative Decisions, 44 DuKE LJ. 1051, 1053-54 (1995).
176 See Cross & Tiller, supra note 168, at 2158-59. This second mechanism is consistent
with most judges' denial of explicit consideration of ideology. See Harry T. Edwards, Public
Misperceptions Concerning the "Politics" ofJudging: Dispelling Some Myths About the D.C. Circuit.
56 U. CoLO. L. REv. 619, 620 (1985) ("[I]t is the law-and not the personal politics of
individual judges-that controls judicial decision-making in most cases .... ."); Patricia M.
Wald, Some Thoughts on Judging as Gleaned from One Hundred Years of the Harvard Law Review
and Other Great Books, 100 HARv. L. REv. 887, 891 (1987) (arguing that the different voting
records of Republican and Democratic judges reflect differences in the "personalit[ies]
and life experiences that lead the judge to vote Democratic or Republican" rather than
explicit consideration of ideology). But cf. Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices
Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 Sup. CT. ECON. RE v. 1, 15-23 (1993) (as-
serting that judges maximize utilityjust like everybody else, and acknowledging that this
will involve deciding cases based on one's values, but also arguing thatjudges derive utility
from playing the game of judging, which limits their propensity to vote based on values
and increases their propensity to follow precedents and legal doctrine).
177 At a minimum,
[s]ome amount of compliance effort will still likely be required to satisfy
the judges who ideologically prefer the agency's action-either because the
judges also have preferences for some amount of compliance with the
"hard look" requirements or because the judges do not feel comfortable
voting ideologically unless they can make at least plausible arguments.
Revesz, supra note 168, at 1770 n.108.
178 See supra notes 152-58 and accompanying text.
2002]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
ject to a process-based evaluation nonetheless perceive that outcome
will also affect the evaluation. The actual criteria by which judges re-
view agency decisions thus seem to mirror the perceptions of the deci-
sionmakers in these experiments: review that is posited on its face as
being process-based is perceived as being affected by both the deci-
sionmaking process and the ultimate outcome of that process.
C. The Impact of Accountability on Agency Staff Members'
Decisionmaking
That judicial review satisfies the criteria for potentially beneficial
accountability does not guarantee that it will enhance every aspect of
agency staff members' decisionmaking. Staff members deal with a va-
riety of issues and bring to their tasks a multitude of decisionmaking
rules and heuristics that render these tasks feasible. The impact of
accountability on a staff member's decisionmaking depends on the
precise heuristics that the individual uses, or more generally on the
mechanism by which those heuristics operate to reduce the magni-
tude of the decisionmaking task. Accountability tends to reduce the
biases inherent in the use of many heuristics, but may have no effect
on others, and can actually magnify the bias introduced by some.1 79
Judicial review is likely to attenuate biases in decisionmaking
when the bias results from shortcuts in the processing of information
or an unwillingness to engage in self-critical thinking-phenomena I
have dubbed "cognitive loafing."180 Cognitive loafing explains a sub-
stantial number of the decisionmaking biases that can affect the
rulemaking process. Accountability has been shown to reduce min-
dless commitments to previous courses of action, 181 and when ac-
countability is individualized it has been postulated to reduce
mindless seeking of group concurrence.18 2 This suggests that judicial
review would decrease a staff member's propensity to apply a decision
179 See Lerner & Tetlock, supra note 115, at 263-64.
180 Cognitive loafing is an obvious modification of the well-established phenomenon
of "social loafing," which occurs when individuals in a group do not make the same effort
to produce a group product as they would if they were individually responsible for the
product. See Harkins & Petty, supra note 126, at 1216. Interestingly, one of the types of
activities for which social loafing has been demonstrated is cognitive effort in problem
solving. See Price, supra note 124, at 330. As already noted, accountability-in particular,
the knowledge that someone can identify an individual's contribution to the group prod-
uct-reduces social loafing. See supra notes 127-32 and accompanying text. Thus, I be-
lieve the term "cognitive loafing" is appropriate because it creates a proper analogy to
social loafing.
181 See Simonson & Nye, supra note 74, at 437; cf Simonson & Staw, supra note 74, at
424-25 (finding that process accountability decreased the tendency of individuals to esca-
late commitments to a previous course of action, but concluding that such tendencies did
not reflect mere mindless or careless decisionmaking).
182 See Marceline B.R Kroon et al., Managing Group Decision Making Processes: Individual
Versus Collective Accountability and Groupthink, 2 INT'LJ. CONFLIcT MGMT. 91, 99 (1991).
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rule that is unique to her office or profession outside of the context
for which the rule was created and has worked in the past. Because
laypeople often are ignorant of some formal decisionmaking rules, ac-
countability does little to correct lay failures to apply such rules prop-
erly.1 83 By contrast, however, accountability is effective at reducing
errors in applying such rules by individuals who have knowledge of
the rules. For example, business students are much more likely to
ignore a commitment to a previous course of investment-that is, to
write off sunk costs-when they were accountable for their investment
decisions.18 4 Studies also suggest that accountability tends to mitigate
bias stemming from the availability heuristic.18 5 Presumably, the
knowledge that one will be accountable leads a decisionmaker to work
harder at generating information that bears on the decision and that
is not easily accessible through memory. Accountability has also con-
sistently been shown to reduce overconfidence.
186
Some biases are the product of the interaction of several cogni-
tive and social mechanisms. For these biases, the impact of accounta-
bility is likely to be more nuanced. The theory behind the
egocentrism bias suggests that accountability holds the potential to
mitigate that phenomenon. Psychologists have demonstrated that ac-
countability leads to increased self-criticism and a willingness to con-
sider alternative perspectives on an issue. 18 7  Accountable
decisionmakers are more apt to try to anticipate reasonable objections
that others might raise in response to their choices than are their un-
183 See Barbara E. Kahn & Jonathan Baron, An Exploratory Study of Choice Rules Favored
for High-Stakes Decisions, 4J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 305, 317 (1995) (reporting that accounta-
bility increased individuals' reliance on "rational" strategies for trading off one attribute of
a decision for another only when the individuals were familiar with the concept of compen-
satory decisionmaking); see also Duane T. Wegener & Richard E. Petty, Flexible Correction
Processes in Social Judgment: The Role of Naive Theories in Corrections for Perceived Bias, 68 J.
PERSONALrry& Soc. PSYCHOL. 36, 45 (1995) (concluding that correction for biases depends
on the decisionmaker's perception of the process which causes the bias); Timothy D. Wil-
son & Nancy Brekke, Mental Contamination and Mental Correction: Unwanted Influences on
Judgments and Evaluations, 116 PSYCHOL. BULL. 117, 130-33 (1994) (noting that motiva-
tional influences like accountability are likely capable of correcting errors when a deci-
sionmaker can be made aware of the potential for bias, but not when the bias involves
"mental contamination" of which the decisionmaker cannot be made aware).
184 See Simonson & Nye, supra note 74, at 437-38.
185 See Diederik A. Stapel et al., The Impact of Accuracy Motivation on Interpretation, Com-
parison, and Correction Processes: Accuracy X Knowledge Accessibility Effects, 74 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 878, 891 (1998); Erik P. Thompson et al., Accuracy Motivation Attenuates Coy-
ert Priming- The Systematic Reprocessing of Social Information, 66 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 474, 484 (1994).
186 See Karen Siegel-Jacobs &J. Frank Yates, Effects of Procedural and Outcome Accountabil-
ity on Judgment Quali, 65 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 1, 15
(1996); Philip E. Tetlock &Jae I Kim, Accountability and Judgment Processes in a Personality
Prediction Task, 52J. PERSONAL=TY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 700, 706-07 (1987).
187 See Tetlock, supra note 152, at 81; Tetlock et al., supra note 152, at 640.
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accountable counterparts. 188 Essentially, accountability could reduce
the egocentrism bias by encouraging empathetic decisionmaking.
The egocentrism bias, however, may stem, at least in part, from a lack
of ability to be sufficiently sensitive to the perspectives of others, and
accountability is unlikely to alleviate this component of the bias.
The psychological explanation for the confirmation bias-that in-
dividuals restrict their search and analysis to those avenues which can
confirm an initial hypothesis-suggests that accountability is likely to
amplify that bias, and this conclusion is borne out in controlled stud-
ies. 189 Individuals work harder to seek evidence supporting their hy-
pothesis when they are accountable. 190 But because they tend to look
only for confirming evidence and limit their considerations to condi-
tions in which they expect their causal hypotheses to hold true, addi-
tional search and analysis often just turn up more confirming
evidence and explanations. Therefore, accountability can make a
decisionmaker even less likely to consider that her initial hypothesis
may have been wrong.191 The confirmation bias, however, is allevi-
ated if an individual is explicitly instructed to consider alternative hy-
potheses to the one she has initially formed. 192 This, however, is
precisely what courts ask of agencies under hard-look arbitrary and
capricious review. Thus, it is uncertain whether judicial review, like
general process-based accountability, will amplify the confirmation
bias, or whether, like instructions to consider alternative hypotheses, it
will attenuate this bias.
The propensity of individuals to consider irrelevant information
when making a decision is a third bias that responds to accountability
in a nuanced manner. There are two psychological mechanisms that
explain this bias. The first mechanism posits that a decisionmaker
desires to please the experimenter who presented her with the prob-
lem. 193 Norms of communication lead an individual to assume that
information provided by the experimenter are relevant, and she works
to use that information, whether or not it is in fact relevant, in choos-
ing an outcome. 194 Consideration of irrelevant information that
stems from this mechanism is likely to be exacerbated by accountabil-
ity. 19 5 If the decisionmaker is held accountable, then she will work
188 See Tetlock, supra note 152, at 81.
189 See Sanbonmatsu et al., supra note 96, at 897.
190 See id. at 894.
191 See id.
192 See Charles G. Lord et al., Considering the Opposite: A Corrective Strategy for Social Judg-
ment, 47J. PERSONALrry & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1231, 1241 (1984); Sanbonmatsu et al., supra note
96, at 898-99.
193 See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
194 Tetlock et al., supra note 88, at 930.
195 See id. at 931.
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even harder to please the experimenter and hence to incorporate all
of the information that she is given into her decision.
The second mechanism derives from a decisionmaker's use of the
representativeness heuristic. By this mechanism, irrelevant informa-
tion changes a decisionmaker's picture of the object of her decision in
terms of representative traits that will influence her.196 To the extent
that irrelevant information distorts the representativeness of the ob-
ject of study, accountability is likely to mitigate the bias. 197 Accounta-
bility will encourage the decisionmaker to separate out truly relevant
from irrelevant information and to guard against irrational prefer-
ence changes in response to irrelevant information. 198 As I concluded
above, the first mechanism that causes the consideration of irrelevant
information is unlikely to affect agency rulemaking. 199 If that conclu-
sion is correct, then accountability would have a beneficial effect on
any tendency by agency staff members to consider irrelevant informa-
tion when formulating rules.
The compromise bias-the aversion of decisionmakers to out-
comes at the extremes of the available choices-is the one potentially
influential bias that is magnified by accountability. 200 This magnifica-
tion occurs because individuals who are uncertain about which attrib-
utes of their choices are most important perceive choices at such
extremes as more difficult to defend.201 Yet, one has to wonder
whether this bias will truly result in nonoptimal decisions in the con-
text of rulemaking. First, some preliminary research indicates that the
compromise bias may not affect managerial decisions-decisions that
reflect an underlying consistent strategy or plan. 20 2 To the extent that
agency staff bring coherent overarching theoretical structures to their
decisionmaking tasks, they may not be subject to the compromise bias.
Second, as for any heuristic bias, the fact that an individual tends to
196 See id. at 916.
197 When the influence of irrelevant information was "deactivated" by informing deci-
sionmakers that the information provided was not prescreened for relevance to the prob-
lem at hand, the tendency of unaccountable decisionmakers to use irrelevant information
decreased, but remained significant. Id. at 925-26. When the decisionmakers were held
accountable for their decision, the influence of irrelevant information disappeared. See id.
at 930-31.
198 See id. at 931.
199 See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
200 See Lerner & Telock, supra note 115, at 264.
201 Simonson, supra note 103, at 161.
202 "Managers ... think strategically[.] [They] decide on the overall plan prior to
making 'local' decisions, examine the fit of considered options with the organization's
goals, and try to understand prior to reaching a decision how various factors influence the
outcome of the decision." ITAMAR SIMONSON & RASHI GLAZER, CONTEXT EFFEcrs IN MANA-
GERIAL DECISION MAKING BY GRouPs AND INDIVIDUALs 4 (Stanford Graduate Sch. of Busi-




avoid extreme choices is not troubling unless she does so in a manner
that leads to suboptimal outcomes. 20 3 Because rulemaking has be-
come essentially an adversarial process, it is often the case that the
best choice for a rule lies in the middle of the available set of options.
The extreme options are usually suggested by interest groups that
value only one of the attributes of the outcomes that the agency must
trade off.20 4 Thus, the bounds of the set of suggested choices from
which a regulator chooses, and against which she must defend her
choice, frequently represent an unreasonable accommodation of
those attributes. For example, when the EPA reduced the heavy-duty
motor vehicle emissions of particulate matter and nitrogen oxides, it
was sued both by the Natural Resources Defense Council because the
standard was not as low as could be achieved by the most advanced
engines, and by the manufacturers because the standard was based on
predictions of what the industry as a whole could achieve rather than
on proven technology.20 5 In essence, the EPA had to balance the un-
certainty and cost of a standard for which feasibility had not yet been
demonstrated against the benefits from that standard. Not surpris-
ingly, environmentalists advocated for a standard that failed to con-
sider the cost to the industry, and the industry advocated a standard
that would guarantee their ability to comply at the expense of health
benefits. The court upheld the EPA rule against both challenges. 20 6
In short, although judicial review is likely to increase the tendency of
an agency to adopt rules that compromise between the most strict and
lenient options suggested by commenters, that influence of review will
be problematic only when the best choice actually lies at one of these
extremes.
III
THE INSTITUTIONAL PROCESS FOR FORMULATING RULES
Thus far, I have used the psychology of accountability to describe
how one might expect judicial review to influence the decisions made
by individual staff members who participate in the rulemaking pro-
cess. I have considered the institutional structure of rulemaking deci-
sions only to the extent necessary to show that that structure is
203 Heuristics are generally useful because they reduce the time and effort for an indi-
vidual to reach a reasonably good decision in many contexts. PLOUS, supra note 42, at 109.
The fact that they lead to biases in decisionmaking is only problematic if the context in
which they are applied makes the bias one worth worrying about-that is, when they lead
to "deviations from normatively derived answers." Id.
204 See Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L.
REv. 1, 11-12 (1997); Philip J. Harter, The Political Legitimacy and Judicial Review of Consen-
sual Rules, 32 AM. U. L. REv. 471, 476 (1983).
205 See Natural Res. Def. Council v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 410, 419-20, 428-29 (D.C. Cir.
1986).
206 Id. at 439.
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unlikely to shield individual staff members from the influence ofjudi-
cial review. There are, however, additional questions raised by the in-
stitutional structure of rulemaking. One might conjecture that this
structure already alleviates the potential for bias in the final agency
decision, thus eliminating the need for judicial review. One might
also wonder whether judicial review has an impact on the dynamics by
which the agency operates that offsets any positive influence that re-
view has on individual staff members' decisions. Keeping these hy-
potheses in mind, I turn now to describe the nature of the
institutional decisionmaking process that agencies use to formulate
and promulgate final legislative rules.
A. The Structure and Dynamics of Agency Formulation and
Promulgation of Rules
Issues that confront agencies in the modern regulatory world are
often too complex to be within the expertise of a single person.
When presented with a problem that appears to require a rule that
affects multiple interests, agencies therefore must develop a mecha-
nism to gather input from the various professional disciplines that
bear on the wisdom of any rule ultimately adopted, as well as from the
offices within the agency whose work could be affected by the rule.
20 7
There is no universal process by which every agency secures such in-
put; each agency may have a different mechanism for drafting rules,
and even within a single agency the mechanism can vary with the na-
ture of the rule and even the personnel assigned to evaluate it.208
Nonetheless, the predominant mechanism for securing input from
staff members with varying perspectives is to assemble a work group
consisting of at least one member from every office in the agency that
might be affected by or interested in the rule.
209
The idealized embodiment of the work group corresponds to
what Tom McGarity has labeled the "team model" of the agency inter-
nal rulemaking process. 210 In the team model, the work group has a
leader who is responsible for managing the resources of the group,
and who may delegate particular tasks to individual members or sub-
committees of the group to take advantage of each member's particu-
lar strength and expertise. 211 Each member of the group, however, is
privy to all of the information relevant to the rulemaking and each
participates in formulating the recommendations and analyses that
207 See KERWIN, supra note 91, at 136-37.
208 See McGarity, supra note 8, at 90.
209 See KERWIN, supra note 91, at 136-37; see also McGarity, supra note 8, at 73 (describ-
ing the basic configuration of an EPA workgroup).




the group passes on to their superiors in the agency.2 12 The process
of generating these recommendations and analysis is thus one of con-
sensus by all group members.
213
There are distinct advantages to the team model when it works as
conceived. Problems that the various perspectives of staff members in
the agency might identify are revealed early, before the agency has
committed significant resources, and before staff members have made
a psychological commitment to a recommendation that ultimately will
be deemed unacceptable by some office within the agency. The final
rule is apt to reflect an accommodation of all of these perspectives.
The very nature of a rulemaking team also tends to reduce interoffice
conflicts about rules. 214 The potential disadvantages of this model,
however, include the cost of the process: the team model is resource
intensive and takes time. 215 The team model also tends to induce
compromises that may lead the staff away from best solutions.216 Fi-
nally, the team model can cause staff to limit the policy choices availa-
ble to the politically accountable agency heads who are ultimately
responsible for the decision. 217 This last objection, however, is only a
disadvantage if one believes that the indirect political accountability
to which agency heads are subject sufficiently constrains them from
sacrificing some of the values that regulations are supposed to respect
due to political expedience, pressure from special interests, or their
own idiosyncratic preferences.218
When time or resources are scarce, or the need for input from
the various offices within the agency is perceived as less important,
agencies tend to use a more hierarchical model for formulating
rules.219 In a pure hierarchical model, the program office responsible
for the regulation covered by the rule takes on the primary responsi-
bility for the rulemaking.220 The program office is responsible for
generating the relevant information, providing needed analysis, de-
212 Id.
213 See KERWIN, supra note 91, at 148-53; McGarity, supra note 8, at 90.
214 See McGarity, supra note 8, at 90-91.
215 Id. at 91.
216 Id. at 92.
217 See id. at 92-94.
218 My own view is that political review is limited in the extent to which it can prevent
such improper influences on agency decisions. See Mark Seidenfeld, Bending the Rules: Ilexi-
ble Regulation and Constraints on Agency Discretion, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 429, 481-87 (1999);
Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV.
1511, 1565-76 (1992). But see RichardJ. Pierce, Jr., The Role of Constitutional and Political
Theory in Administrative Law, 64 TEX. L. REv. 469, 507-09 (1985) (advocating for executive,
rather than judicial, review of agency rules); Paul R. Verkuil, Comment: Rulemaking Ossifica-
tion-A Modest Proposal, 47 ADMIN. L. REv. 453, 457-58 (1995) (proposing fast-track review
of major rules on an up-down basis by Congress).
219 See KERVWN, supra note 91, at 153-54; McGarity, supra note 8, at 95.
220 McGarity, supra note 8, at 94.
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ciding what alternatives to consider, and drafting a preliminary ver-
sion of the rule.221 Other offices within the agency are formally
involved only in reacting to that preliminary draft, and the input of
these offices may come at very late stages of the process.222 This dis-
courages the incorporation of the various perspectives into the rule
and essentially obviates any creative solutions that might take into ac-
count the values underlying these perspectives. 223
In actuality, the work group process is likely to fall between the
idealized team model and the hierarchical model. The team leader
usually comes from the program office, and she may have an agenda
that differs from that of other offices in the agency. The team leader
has some say in membership in the work group.224 The team leader
also has the responsibility to determine the goals of the rule,2 2 5 priori-
tize the collection of information and resolution of issues necessary
for promulgating the rule,2 2 6 call meetings,227 assign tasks to members
and subcommittees of the group,228 and disseminate information to
group members. 229 Even though the group may meet regularly, how-
ever, the information available to some group members may not be
shared with others. Thus, the leader has the ability to isolate members
from other offices and influence the group's decisionmaking process,
and therefore can skew that process to favor the perspective of the
lead office. In the extreme, members from the other offices may sim-
ply choose not to meet their commitments to participate in the work
group process, in which case those offices' input will be limited to
objections late in the process 230 after the team's recommendation may
have gained too much momentum to be derailed.
B. The Influence of Work Groups on Decisionmaking Biases
The previous description of the internal agency processes for
rulemaking indicates that rulemaking is not an individual effort. Ac-
cording to the team model, the decision about which alternatives to
propose to the politically accountable agency heads, as well as the in-
formation and analyses to accompany those alternatives, is a product
of the work group.231 Even in the purely hierarchical model, staff's
actions are most accurately portrayed as a group effort. The individ-
221 Id.
222 See id. at 97.
223 Se id.
224 See KERWiN, supra note 91, at 148.
225 Id.
226 See id. at 148-50.
227 Id. at 149.
228 See id. at 149-50.
229 See id. at 150.
230 See McGarity, supra note 8, at 91-92.
231 See id. at 90.
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ual in the lead office responsible for the rule simply cannot have the
knowledge and ability to provide all of the analyses that go into formu-
lating a rule. 232 Thus, she must rely on others in her office and else-
where in the agency to answer particular questions and help
formulate a proposed rule.23 3 Because agency promulgation of rules
involves essentially group decisionmaking by staff, group dynamics
could affect every aspect of the decisionmaking process and, there-
fore, the ultimate propensity of the rule to reflect individual biases.
23 4
1. The Potential for Groups to Attenuate Individual Decisionmaking
Biases
Research on group decisionmaking indicates that groups tend to
outperform individuals in making many decisions, including solving
problems that require analysis and evaluation. 235 There are several
possible explanations for the advantages of groups over individuals.
First, groups seem to be very effective in error correction. 23 6 When a
problem has a demonstrably correct solution, groups usually get that
solution.237 Because of the superiority of groups in solving problems
with demonstrable solutions, group decision is likely to mitigate the
bias introduced when knowledgeable individuals fail to apply techni-
cal decision rules. For example, if a group of business students were
to make an investment decision, one would need only to point out
that the group should ignore sunk costs for the group to follow that
correct strategy.
232 See id. at 61.
233 See id.
234 See Norbert L. Kerr et al., Bias in Judgment: Comparing Individuals and Groups, 103
PSYCHOL. REv. 687, 694-95 (1996). Unfortunately, there is little direct research on the
impact of group dynamics on individual biases, and the studies that have been done are
sometimes inclusive and may reflect the details of the group structure and the task that the
group is asked to perform. See id. at 692-93.
235 See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, WHY A BOARD? GROUP DECISIONMAKING IN CORPORATE
GovERNANcE 12-16 (UCLA Sch. of Law, Research Paper No. 01-3, 2001), available at http:/
/papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract id=266683; Gayle W. Hill, Group Versus Individual Per-
formance: Are N + 1 Heads Better than One?, 91 PSYCHOL. BULL. 517, 533 (1982). Groups,
however, tend not to do as well as individuals in brainstorming, perhaps because discussion
by other group members interfere with individuals' attempts to generate ideas. SeeMichael
Diehl & Wolfgang Stroebe, Productivity Loss in Brainstorming Groups: Toward the Solution of a
Riddle, 53J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 497, 507-09 (1987).
236 "[Perhaps the greatest] point of group supremacy is the rejection of incorrect ideas
that escape the notice of the individual when working alone." Marjorie E. Shaw, A Compari-
son of Individuals and Small Groups in the Rational Solution of Complex Problems, 44 Am,. J.
PSYCHOL. 491, 502 (1932); see Hill, supra note 235, at 533.
237 See Daniel Gigone & Reid Hastie, Proper Analysis of the Accuracy of Group Judgments,
121 PSYCHOL. BULL. 149, 149 (1997); Patrick R. Laughlin & Alan L. Ellis, Demonstrability and
Social Combination Processes on Mathematical Intellective Tasks, 22 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc.
PSYCHOL. 177, 184 (1986).
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Groups also provide an averaging function for tasks that result in
outcomes that can be ordered along a scale. If each individual mem-
ber proposes a solution with a different value on that scale, the group
may engage in a compromise and choose an outcome with a value
close to the average value of the members' individual solutions. Statis-
tically, if choices of individual group members are distributed nor-
mally around a correct value, then the means of the choices made by
members of groups will also be distributed around the correct value,
but will exhibit less variance than the individual members' choices.
Therefore, this averaging function of groups is a powerful mechanism
for reducing nonsystematic errors in such decisions.238 For problems
that have a unique solution that members cannot demonstrate to be
correct given the information available to them, data indicate that
group decisions tend to be about as accurate as the statistical mean of
the decisions of the group's members.23 9 This supports the hypothe-
sis that group decisionmaking may merely be a mechanism for averag-
ing the choices of group members.
The averaging function of group decisionmaking implies that
having a group make a decision may attenuate the dilution effect. Re-
call that this effect stems from irrational reliance on irrelevant infor-
mation.240 Irrelevant information, however, is just as likely to bias a
decision in one direction from the optimal choice as the other. Thus,
the impact of the dilution effect is nonsystematic and will be reduced
by averaging individual choices. 24' Similarly, the averaging function
of group decisionmaking should also tend to decrease inaccuracies
that result from individual members' being unaware of or ignoring
relevant information. As long as each group member ignores differ-
ent information, group members' individual choices will likely fall on
different sides of the correct outcome and therefore the group deci-
sionmaking process will tend to average out errors in these individual
choices. 242 The averaging function may also imply that group deci-
sionmaking may reduce the overconfidence of decisionmakers. By
improving the accuracy of decisions, the averaging mechanism will
make those decisions fall more in line with members' individual esti-
mations of their accuracy, assuming that the group decisionmaking
288 See Robert B. Zajonc, A Note on Group Judgments and Group Size, 15 HuM. REL 177,
177 (1962) (explaining that the superior performance of groups over individuals can be a
consequence of how the group combines individual inputs); cf Gigone & Hastie, supra
note 237, at 159 (noting that simple cancellation of uncorrelated errors in individual judg-
ments means that groups will almost always perform better than individuals).
289 See Gigone & Hastie, supra note 237, at 153.
240 Tetlock & Boettger, supra note 84, at 389.
241 At least two studies support the hypothesis that group decisionmaking will reduce
the dilution effect. See Gigone & Hastie, supra note 237, at 155.




dynamic does not alter individual members' estimations of the deci-
sion accuracy. By its very nature, however, the seeming propensity of
groups to try to reach a decision that takes into account the prefer-
ences of all members implies that group decisionmaking could exac-
erbate the compromise bias.
Groups may do better than individuals because they can pool the
memories and particular decisionmaking skills of their members. In
other words, group decisionmaking may be "an adaptive response to
bounded rationality, creating a system for aggregating the inputs of
multiple individuals with differing knowledge, interests, and skills."243
When possible, groups tend to divide decisionmaking tasks into sub-
tasks that allow for specialization and assign such subtasks to the indi-
viduals most capable of performing them.244 If the group performs
this aggregation effectively, its knowledge will be close to the sum of
its members' knowledge. Effective aggregation, however, requires at
least that the group decisionmaking process discourage the group
from ignoring or rejecting true information offered by one member
in favor of false information offered by another.245 If a group were
able to pool the resources of its members perfectly, then on each sub-
task required to solve a problem, the group would perform as well as
the member in the group who is best at that subtask. If the group
were asked to make several decisions, the choices of such a group
would be at least as accurate as the best choices of its individual
members.
24 6
Scholarship on group decisionmaking indicates that groups virtu-
ally never approach the accuracy of the best choice of their individual
members for each problem posed. 247 One legal scholar's recent re-
view of the literature comparing group and individual accuracy identi-
fies several studies in which groups outperformed their single best
member.248 Such performance, however, could result simply from the
averaging function of group decisionmaking; it does not indicate that
those groups have effectively pooled the knowledge and skills of their
243 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 235, at 21.
244 See Hill, supra note 235, at 525.
245 See id. at 522 (noting that for problems not involving "eureka-type" solutions, the
presence of low-ability group members hindered group performance because the high-
ability members could not persuade other members of the correctness of their solutions).
246 The best choice of the group's individual members is different from and superior
to the choice of the group's best member. Even the best member can get some answers to
problems wrong that another member of the group gets right. See Gigone & Hastie, supra
note 237, at 160 (distinguishing between the most accurate group member overall and the
most accurate member on each judgment).
247 See id. at 153.
248 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 235, at 22-24 (identifying studies by Hiltz et al. and Micha-
elsen et al. as reporting group decisions with greater accuracy than decisions of the group's
best member, and by Yetton and Bottger as reporting no statistical difference between
these measures of performance).
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members. 249 In addition, there is a rich literature demonstrating that
small groups tend to pay less attention to information known only to a
few members, and focus instead on information that is known to all
members prior to group discussion. 250 This literature indicates that
pooling is, at best, imperfect.251 One must be careful, however, before
rejecting the pooling mechanism entirely. That pooling is imperfect
does not imply that it is valueless as a mechanism for improving deci-
sionmaking. Moreover, the groups involved in the reported studies
were not chosen to exploit differences in training and experience of
group members, which is the way that agency work groups are picked,
and the problems involved did not require various subtasks that each
demanded technical expertise, which is the essence of agency deci-
sions that are made by work groups. Therefore, it may be much easier
for an agency work group to identify the best member of the team to
perform a task, and therefore to be more proficient at pooling the
talents of the group than the literature would suggest.
25 2
Nonetheless, pooling does not depend on interaction between
group members to stimulate the performance of the group, but rather
marshals the skills of each individual and uses those skills in appropri-
ate contexts. Hence, pooling is unlikely to provide a mechanism by
which group dynamics decrease individual decisionmaking biases. In-
stead, pooling only ensures that the group member most expert at a
249 See Gigone & Hastie, supra note 237, at 153 (discussing the results of a study by
Michaelson, Watson, and Black). Comparing the accuracy of group decisions with those of
the single best member of the group makes sense if one is considering whether to use a
group rather than an individual decisionmaker, but not if one is trying to identify the
mechanisms that explain group performance. If one initially cannot identify good deci-
sionmakers, and if the group performs about as well as its best decisionmaker, then having
a group make the decision greatly improves the probability that the decision will be cor-
rect. "Put another way, an advantage of group decisonmaking is that the group is sure to
get the benefit of its best decisionmaker." BAINBPDGE, supra note 235, at 25. If the cost of
a wrong decision greatly exceeds the cost of having more than one individual involved in
the decision, then employing a decisionmaking group makes economic sense.
250 I discuss this literature explicitly when focusing on some of the pathologies of
group decisionmaking. See infra Part III.B.2 (c).
251 See infra Part III.B.2(c).
252 In other words, work groups are teams rather than merely random collections of
individuals, and this really could influence how such groups make decisions, including
their susceptibility to biases. See Paul E. Jones & Peter H.M.P. Roelofsma, The Potential for
Social Contextual and Group Biases in Team Decision-Making Biases, Conditions and Psychological
Mechanisms, 43 ERGONOMICS 1129, 1130-32 (2000). One study that was not concerned with
accuracy in reaching an objectively determined, correct resolution of a problem, but
rather involved a choice among three equally acceptable alternatives, supports the hypoth-
esis that assigning expert roles to group members enhances pooling. See Garold Stasser et
al., Pooling Unshared Information: The Benefits of Knowing How Access to Information Is Distrib-
uted Among Group Members, 82 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 102,
109-11 (2000). Even this study, however, which explicitly focused on group recall of infor-
mation, demonstrated that pooling was far from perfect. Id. at 111 (reporting that even
when expertise was assigned before discussion, groups discussed only 34% of items known
to single group members).
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particular task performs that task. Thus, the impact of pooling on
individual biases should be much the same as the impact of expertise,
and cannot be counted on to alleviate individual decisionmaking
pathologies addressed in this Article.
Some who have studied group decisionmaking also assert that the
interaction of group members engaged in the decisionmaking process
fosters critical evaluation of internal judgments, 253 which in turn can
result in synergies that essentially improve the decisionmaking of the
group's members compared to their decisions made without the bene-
fit of group discussion.254 Such synergies could allow groups to per-
form better than the baseline of the best individual choices on each
task. The fact that groups never approach this level of performance
may mean that groups do not engage in the kind of self-critical evalua-
tion that scholars of group processes envision. Again, however, one
should not dismiss the synergy hypothesis too quickly. First, group
decisionmaking may entail synergies, but the impact of these synergies
on groups' ultimate decisions may be swamped by poor pooling of
group resources. 255 Second, agency decisions tend to have normative
dimensions that the problems in controlled studies do not capture
because, unlike those problems, the issues facing agencies call for
tradeoffs between values. Hence, the inability of groups to out-
perform their members' best answers to each issue might be an arti-
fact of the kinds of problems that group decision researchers have
studied. Third, case studies of group decisionmaking in the negoti-
ated rulemaking context find that such synergies occur when stake-
holders directly negotiate to formulate proposed rules.256 This
suggests, at a minimum, that groups which are properly structured
and whose members have enough at stake can, at least on occasion,
stimulate the kind of open yet critical assessments necessary to create
synergies among group members.
If groups do engage in critical evaluation of internal judgment,
they would be providing the very type of accountability that I postulate
judicial review creates. Therefore, such group dynamics would tend
to mitigate the same biases that judicial review does. The only excep-
tion would be the confirmation bias, which accountability generally
amplifies unless the accountability mechanism explicitly requires deci-
sionmakers to generate and consider alternatives to their working hy-
255 See ErnestJ. Hall et al., Group Problem Solving Effectiveness Under Conditions of Pooling
vs. Interaction, 59 J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 147, 154-55 (1963).
254 See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 235, at 24.
255 This swamping hypothesis is supported by one study in which the group perform-
ance bettered the mean of the individual members' decisions, although it did not exceed
the best member's performance. See Hall et al., supra note 253, at 153-54 (concluding that
group members' interactions improved the group's performance).
256 Freeman, supra note 204, at 33-55.
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potheses.2 57 Nonetheless, I believe that judicial review is still valuable
because, whether group decisionmaking does generate synergies re-
mains uncertain and, as I argue below, without judicial review the
composition, structure, and dynamics of agency work groups often
will preclude whatever potential synergies the group might achieve.
2. The Potential for Groups to Amplify Individual Decisionmaking
Biases
a. Group Polarization
When decisions that a group is asked to make become not only
nonverifiable by other group members, but predictive or normative in
nature, group dynamics can actually reduce the quality of decision-
making. One phenomenon of group decisionmaking is group polari-
zation-the "process whereby group discussion tends to intensify
group opinion, producing more extreme judgments among group
members than existed before discussion."258 When the outcome of a
decision can be placed on a normative scale, such as being risky rather
than safe, liberal rather than conservative, or certain rather than un-
certain, then the dynamics of group decisionmaking can actually in-
crease the tendency of the group to choose an outcome that is on one
end of the scale rather than in the middle. For example, a group of
individuals who are more prone than average to take risks will choose
outcomes with greater risks than the average risk of outcomes that
group members would choose individually.259 By the same token, if
the group were comprised of individuals less prone to risk than aver-
age, the group decision will be safer than the average of the pre-meet-
ing decisions of the group members.260
Group polarization appears to be caused by two psychological
mechanisms, one informational and one normative. 26' Those who at-
tribute the phenomenon to the informational mechanism posit that
group discussion sways a member according to the number and
257 See Lord et al., supra note 192, at 1241; Sanbonmatsu et al., supra note 96, at
898-99.
258 ROBERT S. BARON ET AL., GROUP PROCESS, GROUP DECISION, GROUP ACTION 73
(1992).
259 Group polarization originally was demonstrated with respect to the riskiness of the
group decision, and was even called the "risky shift." DONALD G. ELuis & B. AUBREY FISHER,
SMALL GROUP DECISION MAKING: COMMUNICATION AND THE GROUP PROCESS 45-46 (4th ed.
1994); Noah E. Friedkin, Choice Shift and Group Polarization, 64 AM. Soc. REv. 856, 857
(1999). Subsequently, psychologists demonstrated that polarization can occur with respect
to a wide range of attitudes and decision judgments. See BARON Er AL., supra note 258, at
73; ELLIS & FISHER, supra, at 46.
260 See David G. Myers & Helmut Lamm, The Group Polarization Phenomenon, 83
PSYCHOL BULL. 602, 603 (1976).




strength of new arguments that the member hears in group discus-
sions for or against an outcome.2 62 If group members are predisposed
to reach a certain outcome, that means that they are aware of more
plausible arguments for that outcome than against it. Nonetheless,
they may not all be aware of the same plausible arguments. In that
case, group discussion is likely to expose a group member to more
arguments in support of the favored outcome that are new to her.
This tends to sway the group toward a more extreme outcome in the
direction that the group initially favored.
263
Those who favor a normative explanation believe that groups
often have internal norms that reflect a preference for underlying val-
ues that decisions will ultimately trade off against other values.264 In-
dividuals in a group in which there is a norm that bears on a decision
do not want to be seen as weak with respect to the underlying value.
265
They therefore strive to signal that they prefer the value at least at the
level they believe to be the group average.266 Because this average
level is unknown, however, the result is a competition in which group
members' preferences for this value move in the direction favored by
the group norm. This competition ultimately results in a shift in the
mean preference of group members away from the level of that value
preferred by society-that is, toward a more extreme level than the
initial mean of members' preferences.267 The data on group polariza-
tion support both mechanisms, with the informational mechanism
dominating polarization of factual predictions and the normative
mechanism dominating polarization of value-laden choices. 268
Group polarization is not, by itself, a decisionmaking pathology.
It does not lead to irrational or inaccurate decisions, only to more
variable ones.269 However, when group members share an individual
bias, polarization can cause the group decision to magnify the impact
of that bias.270 The egocentrism bias is one that frequently might be
magnified by polarization. By way of illustration, suppose a group
262 See Amiram Vinokur & Eugene Burnstein, Effects of Partially Shared Persuasive Argu-
ments on Group-Induced Shifts: A Group-Problem-Solving Approach, 29 J. PERSONALTY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 305, 306-07 (1974).
263 See ELLIs & FISHER, supra note 259, at 47.
264 See Robert Steven Baron & Gard Roper, Reaffirmation of Social Comparison Views of
Choice Shifts: Averaging and Extremity Effects in an Autokinetic Situation, 33 J. PERSONALrrY &
Soc. PSYCHOL. 521, 528-30 (1976); Glenn S. Sanders & Robert S. Baron, Is Social Compari-
son Irrelevant for Producing Choice Shifts?, 13J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 303, 311 (1977).
265 Sanders & Baron, supra note 264, at 304.
266 Id.
267 Id.
268 See BARON ET AL., supra note 258, at 74-75.
269 See Gigone & Hastie, supra note 237, at 162-63 (describing the circumstances in
which the greater variability in group decisions might improve accuracy, but noting that an
increase in variability is more likely to decrease accuracy).
270 See Sanders & Baron, supra note 264, at 304.
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composed of professionals from a single discipline and office within
an agency. Group members are likely to share a professional or office
norm that may lead them all to advance one value over alternatives,
and they are all unlikely to consider sufficiently how others who do
not share that norm would assess the available choices. In that case,
having these individuals make the choice as a group is likely to lead to
polarization and hence to an outcome that is even farther from what
others outside their profession or office might choose. As an exam-
ple, consider the EPA's setting of an emission standard that an indus-
try has thus far not achieved-a so called "technology-forcing
standard."271 Engineers from the program office in the EPA may
share an optimistic view of the industry's ability to develop technology
that will meet the standard if money and resources are devoted to that
task. Before the engineers were to meet, the egocentrism bias might
lead them all to prefer a standard that is more stringent than that for
which non-engineers outside the program office would opt. If the en-
gineers were to choose the standard as a group, polarization would
cause the final standard to be more strict than the average of the indi-
vidual engineers' already stringent standard. Polarization might also
magnify overestimation of the likelihood of an event due to the availa-
bility heuristic. Group members who were trained in a similar man-
ner and work on similar projects are apt to be facile at recalling the
same types of events and therefore might all overestimate the
probability for the occurrence of that type of event. Polarization
would then cause a group comprised of such individuals to overesti-
mate that probability by an even greater amount.
Group polarization most likely will also exacerbate the impact of
other biases, especially the confirmation bias. If group members start
with a working hypothesis of what a rule should be, group polarization
is likely to lead them to believe in that rule to a greater extent than
before they engaged in discussion with fellow members. About the
only bias not likely to be magnified by group polarization is the com-
promise bias, which can plague both individual decisionmakers and
groups.272 By encouraging decisions that are more extreme than the
mean of group members' individual choices, polarization would ap-
pear to counteract this bias. Polarization, however, does not discour-
age compromise in a manner that necessarily drives the decision
toward a best solution. Rather, the direction in which polarization
pushes a group decision depends on the vagaries of the group mem-
bers' preferences; it is just as likely to move a middle-of-the-road deci-
271 For a discussion of some of the tradeoffs implicated by technology-forcing stan-
dards, see generally D. Bruce La Pierre, Technologo-Forcing and Federal Environmental Protec-
tion Statutes, 62 IoWA L. REv. 771 (1977).
272 See supra notes 104-13 and accompanying text.
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sion farther away from the optimal outcome as towards it. Hence, the
existence of the compromise effect does not eliminate the need to
worry about group polarization.
b. Group Confirmation Bias
Like individuals, groups also tend to search unduly for informa-
tion and pay too much attention to arguments that confirm initial hy-
potheses. If most of the members of a group share an initial view of
the best decision, the group will seek predominantly information that
supports that view.2 73 This is true even for groups of experts.2 74 More-
over, it is not simply a result of aggregating individual biases; the
members' interaction increases the propensity of the group to prefer
information supporting initially preferred decisions over and above
the level that would occur if one simply pooled the individual requests
for information. 275 The phenomenon of biased information search
decreases as the heterogeneity of members' opinions regarding the
initial hypothesis increases. 276 For groups of five, the bias became in-
significant when two members of the group disagreed about the ap-
propriate decision. 277 Initial heterogeneity, however, did not curb the
bias if the group had discussed the problem and reached some con-
sensus on a preferred solution prior to seeking additional
information.
278
Even when some group members may be aware of information
that undermines a group's initially preferred decision, the group may
fail to consider the information to the same extent as it would con-
sider confirming information. In other words, whether information is
consistent with a group's preferred alternative affects the propensity
of the group to discuss the information as well as its search for addi-
tional information. At the individual level, information consistent
with the consensus group preference tends to be more salient and
hence more easily recalled.279 In addition, there is often a group
norm which expects group members actively to advocate their pre-
ferred outcome during debate.280 At the same time, groups try to sim-
plify their decisionmaking tasks much as individuals do. Therefore,
they try to narrow consideration early in the discussion to a few viable
273 See Schulz-Hardt et al., supra note 97, at 658, 665 (attributing the group bias to
increased commitment to and confidence in a decision on which the group agreed).
274 See id. at 659-60 (using middle managers as research subjects).
275 See id. at 665.
276 See id. at 658.
277 Id.
278 See id. at 665 n.9.
279 Garold Stasser & William Titus, Pooling of Unshared Information in Group Decision





alternatives. 28' As a result, groups tend to discuss information consis-
tent with the position preferred by a majority of members, and to ig-
nore information supportive of positions preferred by a minority of
members.282 Even if a group has no initial majority position, a signifi-
cant plurality preference can bias information discussion in favor of
that preferred outcome and can repress discussion of minority posi-
tions.2 8 3 When only a plurality of the group favors a particular out-
come, however, debate of alternatives preferred by minorities is not
shut down, but tends to be limited to only one minority-preferred out-
come.284 In sum, group dynamics tend to focus both search and dis-
cussion toward information that supports the initially preferred
outcome of a majority of group members. This phenomenon creates
a group analog to the individual decisionmaker confirmation bias to
which agency staff groups could be subject.
c. Inadequate Reporting and Utilization of Unshared Information
In addition to interactions that might increase individual deci-
sionmaking biases, group decisionmaking exhibits its own set of
pathologies that could affect agency rulemaking. As already men-
tioned, groups tend to be imperfect at pooling the totality of informa-
tion available to their members. A key to understanding group
consideration of information is the concept of "shared information."
Information is "shared" when it is known to all members of the group
prior to deliberation; it is "unshared" when it is known to only one
member prior to deliberation.28 5 One of the major impediments to
optimal decisionmaking by groups is their tendency to focus on
shared rather than unshared information. 28 6 This is a particular con-
cern when unshared or partially shared information not only counsels
a different choice than that supported by shared information, but ac-
281 Craig D. Parks & Nicole L. Nelson, Discussion and Decision: The Interrelationship Be-
tween Initial Preference Distribution and Group Discussion Content, 80 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. &
HuM. DECISION PROCESSES 87, 96 (1999).
282 See id. at 95-96.
283 Id. at 96.
284 Id.
285 See Stasser & Titus, supra note 279, at 1468. When information is known to more
than one member of the group but not the entire group, it is "partially shared." Dennis D.
Stewart & Garold Stasser, The Sampling of Critical Unshared Information in Decision-Making
Groups: The Role of an Informed Minority, 28 EUR. J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 95, 99 (1998).
286 See Daniel Gigone & Reid Hastie, The Common Knowledge Effect: Information Sharing
and GroupJudgment, 65J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 959, 971 (1993); James L Larson,
Jr. et al., Discussion of Shared and Unshared Information in Decision-Making Groups, 67 J. PER-
sONALIry & Soc. PSYCHOL. 446, 458 (1994); Stasser & Titus, supra note 279, at 1477 (noting
situations in which ignoring unshared information would be undesirable).
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tually reveals that the choice favored by the unshared information is
the superior one.
28 7
In many instances the problem is not merely that the group
chooses to underutilize unshared information which is raised in dis-
cussion, but rather that the member who is privy to unshared informa-
tion simply fails to mention the information in group discussion. 288
This may be a statistical artifact of the group process-because un-
shared or partially shared information by definition is known to fewer
group members, the chance of some member raising it is less than the
chance that some member will raise information known to every-
one.28 9 But there appear to be mechanisms other than mere statisti-
cal probability at work in suppressing unshared information. Even
after a group member introduces unshared information into the
group discussion, groups spend less time considering that information
than they do shared information, 290 and unshared information influ-
ences their decisions less than shared information does. 291 In addi-
tion, the likelihood of a group hearing unshared information and
relying on it depends on the status of the member who has the infor-
mation. If the member is perceived by the group to be particularly
competent at the task that the group is discussing, she is more likely to
speak and to use unshared information to persuade the group to fol-
low her preferred choice.292 Group leaders would thus be more apt to
mention and prompt the group to rely on unshared information than
would low-status members.
The failure of groups adequately to learn about and consider un-
shared information has been demonstrated primarily for groups in
which individual members were randomly assigned and did not have
special expertise. In addition, many of the problems on which the
groups were assigned to work are simplistic, and the data sets given to
the participants may contain only a few cues about the best resolution
of each problem. One study, however, did assign each member a
unique role within the decisionmaking group, and supplied each with
287 Stewart & Stasser, supra note 285, at 96 (defining "hidden profile" as a decision
problem in which unshared information favors a superior alternative to that favored by
shared information); see also Gwen M. Wittenbaum, Information Sampling in Decision-Making
Groups: The Impact of Members' Task-Relevant Status, 29 SMALL GROUP RES. 57, 58 (1998)
(pointing out that "incomplete information exchange can result in the group overlooking
a decision alternative that is supported by the collective knowledge of all members").
288 See Larson et al., supra note 286, at 458; Stasser & Titus, supra note 279, at 1476.
289 See Stasser & Titus, supra note 279, at 1477.
290 See Larson et al., supra note 286, at 458 (proffering several explanations for why
shared information is repeated more often than unshared information that is introduced
into group discussions).
291 Gigone & Hastie, supra note 286, at 971.
292 See Wittenbaum, supra note 287, at 77 (finding that members of a group exper-




role-appropriate unshared information. This study concluded that
such groups of "experts," while less prone to focus only on shared
information than are groups of nonexperts, nonetheless consider
shared information more than they do unshared information. 293
Moreover, this study used an experimental method involving a com-
plex decision for which members had hundreds of relevant cues-a
decision task not dissimilar from one an agency might face.294 Thus
there is some support in the literature for the conclusion that groups
similar to agency staff groups, working on problems similar to those
that agency groups might encounter, tend to underutilize unshared
information.
d. Groupthink and Related Phenomena
Another group decisionmaking pathology that has attracted at-
tention is that of "groupthink." Irving Janis, who coined the term,
defines it as "a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are
deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members' strivings
for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alter-
native courses of action."295 Essentially, groupthink involves a dy-
namic in which the desire to be part of the' group and to share its
values and prestige leads members to feel that the group is morally
superior to its opponents, to stifle dissent, and to fail to subject the
group consensus to critical consideration.296 The result frequently is a
decision that reflects incomplete analysis after a biased information
search, and that fails to include contingency plans in case the decision
does not work as expected.297 According tojanis, groupthink is apt to
occur when a group is cohesive and insulated from outside feedback
during the decisionmaking process, especially when its members are
homogeneous in terms of social background and ideology, when the
group leader and decisionmaking norms and processes tend to direct
the group toward a preselected outcome, and when the group be-
lieves that it faces a crisis situation in which there is high stress and
little opportunity for a decision that will improve the status quo.29
8
Janis developed the concept of groupthink by analyzing various
public policy fiascos during the 1960s and 1970s. The very nature of
293 See Dennis J. Devine, Effects of Cognitive Ability, Task Knowledge, Information Sharing
and Conflict on Group Decision-Making Effectiveness, 30 SMALL GROUP RES. 608, 616-17, 626
(1999).
294 Id. at 616-17 (studying group creation of a strategic business plan for a fictional
regional airline).
295 IRVING L. JANIS, GRouPmINK PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES oF PoLIcy DECISIONS AND
FiAscos 9 (1982).
296 Id. at 256-58.
297 Id. at 175.
298 See id. at 242-56.
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some of the predicates for groupthink, however, makeJanis's hypoth-
eses extremely difficult to test in controlled laboratory settings. This
has led to some controversy about the actual prevalence of groupthink
as a phenomenon, 299 and whetherJanis's predicates for and effects of
groupthink actually characterize many real-world decisions.300 For ex-
ample, although Janis includes groups' cohesiveness as an essential
predicate for groupthink, laboratory studies have found that such co-
hesiveness does not affect the propensity of groups to fail to subject
their decisions to intragroup critical thought.301 Of course it is possi-
ble that the level of cohesiveness that can be achieved in the labora-
tory simply cannot approach that which inheres in a group whose
members "meet together for many weeks and work on decisions to
which each member will be committed." 30 2 Nonetheless, some
groupthink behaviors have been induced in groups by manipulating
the directiveness of group leaders.30 3 Leaders who both stressed the
importance of the group reaching unanimity when faced with a crisis
situation and suggested their own solution at the outset of the group
meeting significantly discouraged other members from proposing al-
ternative solutions or introducing facts into the discussion.30 4 Moreo-
ver, this result occurred in groups whose leaders were simply
designated and briefed before the meeting about the style they should
use during the discussion.30 5 Thus, the legitimacy of being designated
a group leader may be enough, when coupled with a directive leader-
ship style, to cut off debate and critical evaluation of the leader's ini-
tially suggested decision.30 6
Some researchers have surmised that groupthink might not be
rare in government decisionmaking.3°7 Tom McGarity has even sug-
gested that a potential drawback to the team model for staff develop-
299 See Kroon et al., supra note 182, at 92 (noting that groupthink's "theoretical and
empirical status has yet to be established in a firm and unequivocal manner").
300 Although there has been little research to replicate Janis's findings, and laboratory
experiments have not always supported his hypotheses, there is "a sufficient body of case
study findings that substantiate the basic idea of groupthink." Id.; see also Annette R. Flip-
pen, Understanding Groupthink from a Self-Regulatory Perspective 30 SMALL GROUP REs. 139,
158 (1999) (asserting that groupthink "can occur in almost any type of group"); Matie L.
Flowers, A Laboratory Test of Some Implications ofJanis's Groupthink Hypothesis, 35 J. PERSONAL-
riv & Soc. PSYCHOL. 888, 888 (1977) (concluding that ifJanis's hypothesis is correct it
could be "especially relevant in understanding governmental decisions, both at a local and
a national level").
301 See Flippen, supra note 300, at 140-41.
302 JANIs, supra note 295, at 242.
303 Flippen, supra note 300, at 141 (summarizing the literature).
304 See Flowers, supra note 300, at 889, 893 (reporting that teams with "open leaders"
proposed more solutions and introduced more facts into their analyses of the posed prob-
lem than did "closed leaders").
305 See id. at 890.
306 See id. at 895.
307 E.g., id. at 888.
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ment of a rule is the potential for the work group to engage in
groupthink. 308 Certainly, agencies frequently deal with pressure situa-
tions in which a rule is a response to some unforeseen turn of events
or even legislative and judicial compulsion that the agency adopt a
rule. Thus, the group of staff members formulating and analyzing a
potential rule frequently will have reasons to favor quickly reaching a
unanimous decision over taking time to ensure the decision is
sound.30 9 Moreover, work group leaders tend to come from the pro-
gram office for the area in which the rule will operate, and hence
have perhaps the broadest base of relevant expertise. 310 Leaders
often can select team members, 311 and may share the program office's
agenda regarding what the rule should achieve. Therefore, they have
the authority that comes with expertise and some power over group
members, as well as the legitimacy of being designated leaders.
Nonetheless, I suspect that groupthink is more of a problem
when the work group's interactions become hierarchical. In those sit-
uations, the group that actually formulates the rule is likely to be dom-
inated by members from the program office who share a professional
and workplace background. Meanwhile, in the team model, members
of the work group have an allegiance both to the group and to their
home offices within the agency. They often will be required to report
to those offices from time to time, which makes the group less isolated
and more subject to reality checks by staff outside the work group.
IV
THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW ON RULEMAING WORK
GROUPS' STtRUCTURE AND DYNAMIcS
My analysis of the institutional nature of agency rulemaking dem-
onstrates that the rulemaking process involves a group effort and for
that reason holds the potential to improve the quality of staff decision-
making. Group dynamics, however, usually do not live up to their po-
tential, and my analysis indicates that when the institutional dynamics
work imperfectly, they threaten to amplify individual decisionmaking
biases as well as to introduce additional biases into the process. In
particular, this Article has identified four pathologies that can affect
group decisionmaking: group polarization, group confirmation bias,
inadequate reporting and utilization of unshared information, and
groupthink. What remains for discussion is the influence of judicial
308 McGarity, supra note 8, at 92.
809 See id.
310 See id. at 73; see also KERWIN, supra note 91, at 148 (asserting that "[t]he leaders of
work groups are usually selected because of their expertise in the subject matter of the new
rule").
811 McGarity, supra note 8, at 73.
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review on rulemaking work groups' dynamics. In particular, is review
likely to mitigate or reinforce the propensity for group decisionmak-
ing to aggravate decisionmaking bias? There is some psychology re-
search that addresses the impact of accountability on group
decisionmaking processes, but not much. Therefore, assessing the im-
pact of judicial review on these processes requires some speculation.
The key to this assessment, however, lies in the observation that the
undesirable impacts of group decisionmaking stem from three attrib-
utes of the structure or dynamics of the group-its homogeneity, its
hierarchical nature, and the style of its leader. There are reasons to
believe that judicial review beneficially influences all three.
Homogeneity is perhaps the most critical group attribute because
it complicates all four of the identified pathologies that can afflict
group decisionmaking. Group polarization does not occur every time
a group makes a decision.312 A prerequisite for group polarization is
that the initial preferences of the group fall on one side of the societal
norm, and even then the final group disposition may not be signifi-
candy more extreme than the average of its members' initial prefer-
ences.313 When groups start with mixed initial preferences, the
individual attitudes of group members actually depolarize.3 14 In other
words, polarization is likely to occur when groups are "attitudinally
homogenous," which, in turn, is more likely to be the case when mem-
bers share similar professional and work backgrounds than when they
pursue different disciplines and come from different offices within
the agency. This makes sense when one thinks of the normative ex-
planation for polarization. Without homogeneity, the group mem-
bers are less likely to share a norm that inspires symbolic competition.
Similarly, the group dynamic leading to the confirmation bias de-
pends on the group's reacting to consensus about the preferred out-
come prior to completing their search for information or discussion
of the problem. People use social consensus information to deter-
mine the point at which the group tries to converge on a particular
solution.
However, this guideline is only accurate to the degree that the
group composition itself is "unbiased" (i.e. that the group composi-
tion somehow represents the opinion distribution in the popula-
tion).... [A] problem of homogeneous groups could be that they
don't recognize this similarity bias in the group composition and
thus overestimate the validity of their social consensus
information.3 15
312 See Amiram Vinokur & Eugene Burnstein, Depolarization of Attitudes in Groups, 36J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 872, 884 (1978).
313 See id. at 872, 884.
314 See id.
315 Schulz-Hardt et al., supra note 97, at 667.
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This would explain why homogeneous groups are more susceptible to
the confirmation bias than are heterogeneous groups.
3 16
Homogeneity magnifies the propensity of groups to focus on
shared information in a more direct fashion. When group members
all come from a common background, their knowledge relevant to
the problem the group faces is likely to overlap substantially. Homo-
geneity not only restricts the knowledge base of the group, it also re-
sults in the narrow knowledge base being shared by the group
members, and thus increases the probability that the group will not
seek to expand that base before making a decision. In other words, in
a heterogeneous group, little information is likely to be fully shared
prior to group discussion. This lack of shared information forces the
group to consider information initially known only to one or a few
group members. Not so in homogeneous groups.
317
According to Janis, homogeneity also increases the probability
that an otherwise susceptible group will fall victim to groupthink.
"Lack of disparity in social background and ideology among the mem-
bers of a cohesive group makes it easier for them to concur on
whatever proposals are put forth by the leader .... "318 Thus, the
willingness of members of homogeneous groups to follow the leader,
as well as their propensity to know the same information, make such
groups more susceptible to groupthink than heterogeneous groups.
Hierarchical structures in groups amplify problems stemming
from ignoring unshared information and perhaps from the willing-
ness of group members to accept the solutions put forth by directive
leaders. Low-status members in a group are less likely to mention un-
shared information than are those with recognized experience or task-
related competence.31 9 In other words, for a group in which all mem-
bers are valued for what they bring to the task, the likelihood that
members will share information known uniquely to them increases.
Moreover, to the extent that group leaders are seen as high-status
members with significant task competency, 320 a directive leader could
channel discussion toward information to which she alone is privy,
tending to support her preferred outcome. Other members aware of
information that would support a different outcome frequently might
fail to mention it to the group. This would contribute to the forma-
tion of an early consensus around the leader's initial suggestion, one
316 See id. at 666.
317 Id.
318 JAuis, supra note 295, at 250.
319 Wittenbaum, supra note 287, at 77.
320 Recall that leaders of agency work groups often come from the lead office, which
has the most directly relevant experience with the problem the rule will address, and usu-
ally are chosen for their expertise on the subject. See KFRwIN, supra note 91, at 148; Mc-
Garity, supra note 8, at 73.
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of the prime contributors to groupthink. Directive leadership is the
only factor identified by Janis that has been shown to cause
groupthink behavior in controlled laboratory studies.321 Moreover,
directive leadership induces such behavior even when groups are not
particularly cohesive. 322 Therefore, directive leadership may be the
primary culprit for the fiascos thatJanis explored to discover the phe-
nomenon of groupthink.
Judicial review discourages agencies from relying on homogene-
ous groups to formulate rules because the agency must address any
question or problem that a challenger might raise on review and that
a judge might consider important, regardless of the background of
the judge. Thus, early on in the rulemaking process, the agency
needs to take into account perspectives that may be held by those with
different professional training and whose work might focus on differ-
ent effects of the rule.
For similar reasons, judicial review is likely to discourage hierar-
chical structures in agency work groups. The prospect of judicial re-
view might encourage those with knowledge of unshared information
that undermines an original majority consensus to communicate it to
the group. This is because group members are less likely to regard
the information as threatening if its introduction is necessary to pro-
tect the group's decision from a surprise attack at the judicial review
stage. In other words, the input of each member becomes valuable, if
only as a means of identifying potential avenues of challenge in the
courts. Judicial review therefore makes group members less likely to
regard colleagues who bring a unique perspective to the rulemaking
process as less deserving of respect, which in turn encourages these
colleagues to contribute their knowledge to the group discussion.
Even a work group leader with an agenda will be apt to abide dissent
from other group members in order to assure that the rule that
emerges is well insulated against judicial challenge.
Judicial review also holds great potential to alleviate groupthink
and the impact of directive leadership. First, there is empirical evi-
dence that requiring a group to explain its decisions reduces
groupthink behavior.323  Moreover, suggested antidotes to the
groupthink phenomenon include fostering of open discussion of al-
ternatives to the group's ultimate decision, consideration of worst-case
scenarios, preventing group leaders or other high-status members
321 See Flippen, supra note 300, at 140-41.
322 See id.
323 See Kroon et al., supra note 182, at 109-10 (reporting that group accountability
reduced pressures towards uniformity and counteracted leader-centered decisionmaking,




from championing their preferred outcomes early in the decisionmak-
ing process, and having- outside experts review the group decision.
324
Arbitrary and capricious review explicitly calls for the consideration of
alternatives, encourages the work group to consider devil's advocates'
positions, and provides the agency with incentives to get feedback on
the rule from individuals outside the work group. Thus, judicial re-
view provides an effective mechanism for enhancing the impact of ac-
countability and discouraging the impact of directive leadership.
CONCLUSION
Those who have recently written about the impact of judicial re-
view on agency decisionmaking have not treated the practice kindly.
Many express concern about the burdens that review places on agen-
cies, and some even conclude that judicial review hurts the quality of
the decisions that the agency makes when adopting a new rule. These
critics, however, assume that the agency, and the particular deci-
sionmakers within it, react as rational maximizers of utility toward the
incentives created by judicial review. At most, they give some passing
reference to psychological constructs of how individuals and groups
make decisions.
This Article takes as a major premise that psychology has much to
tell us about the ways in which decisions deviate from the assumptions
that public choice theorists and others who rely on economic rational-
ity use in evaluating the workings of our governmental institutions.
Individuals do not tend to optimize every decision, but instead rely on
habitual decision rules and other rules of thumb as shortcuts to mak-
ing decisions. In certain situations, these shortcuts can lead to avoida-
ble bad decisions. One mechanism for avoiding careless or improper
reliance on such shortcuts is to hold the decisionmaker accountable
for her choice. If structured properly, accountability can attenuate
many of the systematic biases that flow from improper use of decision-
making shortcuts.
The structure of beneficial accountability corresponds very well
to the nature of judicial review of agency rulemaking under current
standards of arbitrary and capricious review. There is also reason to
believe that agency staff members react to judicial review of a rule as
they do to direct accountability for a personal decision. In addition,
arbitrary and capricious review is likely to reduce any magnification of
individual biases that result from the group nature of agency decision-
making. Therefore, arbitrary and capricious review provides incen-
tives for agency staff to take appropriate care and to avoid many
systematic biases when formulating rules and ushering them through
324 SeeJ IS, supra note 295, at 262-71.
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the rulemaking process. This does not mean thatjudicial review will
eliminate all decisionmaking biases. There is at least one bias, the
propensity of individuals to avoid extreme choices even when logic
would not dictate that they do so, thatjudicial review might even exac-
erbate. In addition, review will never prevent all biased decisionmak-
ing, but instead can only encourage decisionmaking processes that
reduce the probability of bias.
Finally, a note of caution is appropriate: the psychological results
which I discuss all come from laboratory experiments, some of which
involve very different individuals performing very different tasks than
those involved in the formulation of agency rules. Thus, the sugges-
tion that judicial review improves the quality of agency rulemaking
must be seen as just that-a suggestion. Nonetheless, I believe that
there is enough evidence to warrant further consideration of the likely
impact of review on the performance of agency staff, and, more partic-
ularly, to refute critics who, without considering this evidence, con-
clude that judicial review has a deleterious impact on the quality of
rulemaking.
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